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A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLUENCE:
AMERICAN "STATE ACTION" LAW AND THE APPLICATION
OF SOUTH AFRICA'S SOCIOECONOMIC RIGHTS
GUARANTEES TO PRIVATE ACTORS
STEPHEN ELLmANN*
The final South African constitution1 widened the range of consti-
tutional protection beyond the classic protection of negative liberties
against the state in two very striking ways. First, it constitutionalized a
range of socioeconomic rights that constitute positive liberties or
claims against the state. Second, it made clear that the provisions of
the Bill of Rights could apply not only vertically (protecting the indi-
vidual against the state) but also - to continue the spatial metaphor
- diagonally (protecting individuals against a variety of semi-private
actors sufficiently linked to the state to count as part of it) and horizon-
tally (controlling private actors' relations with each other). But how
should courts decide when these rights do, or don't, apply?
I believe that as part of answering this question, South African
courts should borrow from American jurisprudence addressing the
question of when private actors are engaged in "state action" and
hence subject to United States constitutional requirements. This argu-
ment may be surprising, because South Africa's explicit textual author-
ization of application of the Bill of Rights to private actors might seem
to foreclose the need to look for connections between those actors and
the state. Indeed, South Africa's Constitutional Court, in rejecting full
horizontal application of the Bill of Rights under the interim constitu-
* Associate Dean for Faculty Development and Professor of Law, New York Law
School. This is a revised version of an essay recently published in THE POST-APARTHEID
CoNsmIUONS: PERSPECrIVES ON SouTH AFRuCA's BASIc LAW (Penelope Andrews & Ste-
phen Ellmann eds. 2001) (© Witwatersrand University Press). I thank the publishers,
the Witwatersrand University Press and the Ohio University Press, for permission to
republish this piece, which is stronger as a result of the editorial work which Pat Tucker
did in connection with its book publication. I also thank Penny Andrews, Geoff
Budlender, Alta Charo, Jonathan Klaaren and Nancy Rosenbloom for suggestions,
Daniel Curtin and Marta Kiszely for research help, and New York Law School for finan-
cial support of this work.
1. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996. Particular sec-
tions of this constitution are cited hereafter simply by section number (for example, "s
24(b)").
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ion, seemed to view U.S. state action law as enabling courts to do indi-
rectly, "sometimes with great ingenuity," what South Africa's final
constitution now allows them to do directly.2 As I hope to show, how-
ever, South Africa's constitution still reflects a view that state actors are
more self-evidently subject to constitutional limits than private actors
are, and it remains appropriate and useful to assess the "state-connect-
edness" of private actors as a part of determining whether they should
be subject to constitutional obligations.
State action doctrine in the United States is elaborate, puzzling
and - currently - quite restrictive. It has engaged scholars for at least
sixty years. Happily, one of the scholars who turned his attention to
this field is Dean Harry Wellington, whose 1961 essay, The Constitution,
The Labor Union, and "Governmental Action", incisively assessed both the
doctrinal and the institutional issues involved in the potential exten-
sion of state action concepts to include the activities of labor unions.3
Dean Wellington's article, not surprisingly, remains illuminating today,
not only for American law but also for understanding the potential
course of South African constitutional development. It is a pleasure to
be able to address this constitutional confluence as part of this sympo-
sium in honor of Harry Wellington, a leader of American legal educa-
tion both as a scholar and also, at the Yale Law School and here at New
York Law School, as a dean.
Attention to state action factors in South Africa would of course
be quite unnecessary if the South African constitution simply and
unambiguously applied all of its rights provisions to private actors. It is
possible to interpret the two innovations cited above, in horizontality
and in socioeconomic rights, to extend the reach of the constitution to
a truly vast range of activity by private citizens. Individuals, like the
state itself, might be found constitutionally responsible for providing
others with such rights as free speech; free association; housing; health
care, food, water and social security; a decent environment; and a basic
education.
2. Du Plessis and Others v. De Klerk and Another, 1996 (3) S.A. 850, 872 (CC)
(judgment of Kentridge AJ). The "interim constitution" was South Africa's first post-
apartheid constitution, enacted as Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200
of 1993. The present constitution, cited in note I supra, replaced the interim
constitution.
3. Harry H. Wellington, The Constitution, The Labor Union, and "Governmental Ac-
tion", 70 YALE L.J. 345 (1961).
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The language of the relevant provisions, however, does not com-
pel this reading. One reason to hesitate is that most of the socioeco-
nomic rights sections are qualified, even as applied to the state itself,
by constitutional recognition of the limited resources available to the
state for realizing them. 4 If private actors are bound by these provi-
sions at all, there surely must be some similar limit on their
obligations.
In addition, the application of these rights to private actors is gov-
erned by two provisions whose meaning is by no means self-evident.
One is section 8(2), whose studied ambiguity provides that:
A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or ajuris-
tic person if, and to the extent that, it is applicable, taking
into account the nature of the right and the nature of any
duty imposed by the right.
The other is section 239. Its definition of the "organs of state" to which
the constitution applies potentially recharacterizes many semi-private
actors as such state organs. This section's language is simultaneously
far-reaching and elusive, though certainly less elusive than 8 (2). It pro-
vides that:
"organ of state" means 
-
(a) any department of state or administration in the
national, provincial, or local sphere of govern-
ment; or
(b) any other functionary or institution -
(i) exercising a power or performing a function
in terms of the Constitution or a provincial
constitution; or
(ii) exercising a public power or performing a
public function in terms of any legislation,
but does not include a court or a judicial
officer.
To explore the question of when the socioeconomic rights provi-
sions (as well as other rights) do bind private persons, and what duties
these provisions might actually impose, I will draw in part on the exten-
sive United States jurisprudence dealing with the concept of "state ac-
tion" - the requirement, in almost all cases arising under the United
States constitution, that the challenged action be attributable to the
4. See ss 24(b), 26(2), 27(2), 29(1)(b).
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government before it can be found subject to constitutional limits.5 It
is not my purpose to urge that American state action doctrine be
adopted without modification by South Africa's courts; on the con-
trary, it is quite clear that South Africa's framers have decided both to
extend the reach of their constitution to cover more private conduct
than the U.S. constitution encompasses, and to determine which pri-
vate action to reach by applying criteria considerably different from
those highlighted by state action doctrine. Nonetheless, American ef-
forts to grapple with the state action issue do illuminate the issues fac-
ing South African courts, and provide some guidance towards their
resolution.
How far private actors should be bound by the socioeconomic
rights provisions depends, first, on the meaning of section 239's defini-
tion of "organs of state," since all organs of state are bound by the Bill
of Rights under section 8(1). This definition is principally concerned,
it seems, with identifying semi-private actors - "functionaries or insti-
tutions" who are performing "public functions." One line of American
state action law has focused on a very similar issue. American experi-
ence, I will urge, suggests that the potentially broad language of the
section 239 definition should be read both to exclude many actors
whose connection with the state is limited, and to include actors who
wield state authority unlawfully - despite section 239's specification
that functionaries or institutions must act "in terms of' constitutional
or statutory law.
For those actors who do not qualify as "organs of state," section
8(2) provides the textual standard, directing attention to "the nature
of the right and the nature of any duty imposed by the right." Ameri-
can state action law has been sharply criticized for obscuring these very
issues, and the South African constitution carefully avoids that peril.
But the language of 8(2) is broad enough to encompass attention to
the factors of state-connectedness that American state action law does
highlight.
5. "Nearly all of the Constitution's self-executing, and therefore judicially en-
forceable, guarantees of individual rights shield individuals only from government ac-
tion." LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1688 (2d ed.1988). The best
known textual suggestion of the state action requirement appears in section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the second sentence of which provides: "No State shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws." The Supreme Court read this sentence's references to state conduct to
reflect that the Amendment empowered the federal courts and Congress only to bar
state misconduct and not to directly regulate private individuals' behavior, in The Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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This attention should be paid. The application of the Bill of
Rights to private actors is meant to constrain private abuse of power.
This is a noble goal, but as we will see in some detail, it entails risks as
well, both to the separation of powers between the branches of govern-
ment and to the overall protection of individual rights. These risks
should not be paralyzing, but they also should not be ignored. A focus
on the connections between private actors and the state - in other
words, a state action inquiry - will help South African courts to decide
which cases are appropriate for full application of the constitution to
private actors and which are not.
I. SECTION 239 AND THE CONCEPT OF "ORGANS OF STATE"
Before we ask when socioeconomic rights bind private actors,
however, we must first decide when actors are actually private. We
know from section 8(1) that "[t] he Bill of Rights applies to all law, and
binds the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all organs of
state." The most ambiguous term here is "organs of state," and the
definition of this term is supplied by section 239 (quoted above). As we
will see, this language is easily broad enough to embrace many puta-
tively private actors. 6
Let us postpone for a moment examination of section 239(b)'s
tantalizing reference to "any other functionary or institution," and ex-
amine first the meaning of 239 (a)'s reference to "any department of
state or administration in the national, provincial or local sphere of
government." Does this definition include parastatals (quasi-private or-
ganizations that are infused with government control)? South African
readers may be surprised to learn that United States constitutional law
suggests the answer may well be "yes." The central case is a very recent
one, Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation.7 In Lebron, 8 of
6. Stuart Woolman has characterized the expansion in scope of this definition, as
compared to the analogous provision of the interim constitution, as "stunning." Stuart
Woolman, Application, in MATTHEW CHASKALSON ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF SOUTH
AFRICA at 10-62 (Revision Service 5, 1999). Woolman also illuminatingly discusses the
possible meanings of "organs of state," in the context of the interim constitution, id. at
10-35 to 10-39.
7. 513 U.S. 374 (1995). Ronald Krotoszynski, Jr., however, observes that before
the Lebron decision the lower courts in the United States had produced "a raft of rather
unconvincing opinions that rely entirely on formalistic analyses to avoid holding gov-
ernment-sponsored and controlled corporations accountable for observing constitu-
tional norms." Ronald Krotoszynski, Jr., Back to the Briarpatch: An Argument in Favor of
Constitutional Meta-Analysis in State Action Determinations, 94 MICH. L. REv. 302, 326
(1995).
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the 9justices of the Supreme Court agreed that the National Railroad
Passenger Corporation (more commonly known as Amtrak) was sub-
ject to the First Amendment's protection of free speech - not because
Amtrak was a private actor engaged in state action, but because Amtrak
was actually itself a part of the state. To be sure, Amtrak was a corpora-
tion, but the Court held, in an opinion by Justice Scalia,
that where, as here, the Government creates a corpora-
tion by special law, for the furtherance of governmental
objectives, and retains for itself permanent authority to
appoint a majority of the directors of that corporation,
the corporation is part of the Government for purposes of
the First Amendment.8
As the Court said, " [i] t surely cannot be that government, state or
federal, is able to evade the most solemn obligations imposed in the
Constitution by simply resorting to the corporate form." 9 Even the fact
that the statute creating Amtrak contained a "disclaimer of [govern-
ment] agency status"10 did not alter the Court's view; the question of
whether an entity is part of the government for purposes of the consti-
tution is a constitutional question, which statutes cannot answer.1 In
short, in the United States - and surely in South Africa - adding some
of the trappings of private status cannot render a government agency
non-governmental.
Perhaps the next question is: if a parastatal is part of the govern-
ment, does its privatization and sale remove it from the government
for purposes of 239(a)? Here, surely, the answer is "maybe". Govern-
ments can sell things just as private individuals can, and when the ef-
fect of the sale is to terminate entirely the government's distinctive
interest in the item sold, it seems fair to say that that item - even if the
"item" is an entire corporate institution - is now simply no longer part
of the government. (Its actions may still be subject to constitutional
regulation on other grounds, however, including under section
239(b), to which we will turn in a moment.)
But not all sales are so complete. Suppose, for example, that the
government retains some seats on the privatized entity's board of di-
rectors, or that it provides the entity with subsidized electricity and
guaranteed contracts. Whether or not these links would by themselves
be sufficient to call for the application of constitutional limits, in the
8. Id. at 400.
9. Id. at 397.
10. Id. at 392.
11. Id. at 392-93.
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context of a privatization of a previously public entity they might press
for a conclusion that the supposedly privatized entity has never actually
departed from the government's ambit. This conclusion might be es-
pecially persuasive if the alternative would be, as the Lebron court
feared, to allow government to escape its most profound obligations
under a veneer of privatization.
The United States Supreme Court confronted a problem of this
sort in Evans v. Newton.12 That case addressed an effort by Macon,
Georgia to disentangle itself from the operation of a park, which had
been willed in trust to the city in 1911 for the use of whites only. Faced
with the constitutional mandate of desegregation of public facilities
after Brown v. Board of Education,'3 Macon began operating the park on
a desegregated basis, but suit was brought to challenge this desegrega-
tion as a breach of the will. "Thereafter the city resigned as trustee and
.... [t]he Georgia court.., appointed three [private] individuals as
new trustees ... .-"14 The Supreme Court somewhat half-heartedly as-
sumed, arguendo, that a testator could have established an entirely pri-
vate, and racially discriminatory, park. That did not conclude the case,
however, because:
This park.., is in a different posture. For years it was an
integral part of the City of Macon's activities. From the
pleadings we assume it was swept, manicured, watered, pa-
trolled, and maintained by the city as a public facility for
whites only, as well as granted tax exemption .... The
momentum it acquired as a public facility is certainly not
dissipated ipso facto by the appointment of 'private' trust-
ees. So far as this record shows, there has been no change
in municipal maintenance and concern over this
facility. 15
South African courts may well be similarly skeptical of government pol-
icies that appear to seek the evasion of constitutional obligations
rather than legitimate governmental objectives. 16
12. 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
13. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
14. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. at 298.
15. Id. at 301. The Court also suggested that because parks were intrinsically a
public function, even private parties would not be allowed to segregate them. Id. at 301-
02.
16. The U.S. Supreme Court's skepticism, however, had its limits. In a subsequent
decision, the Court accepted as constitutional the Georgia courts' decision that since a
public, discriminatory park was now unconstitutional, the trust established by the will
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Now let us turn to 239(b), and its provision that organs of state
can include "any other functionary or institution" performing certain
functions. As a preliminary matter, the reference to "functionaries"
here may serve in part to make clear that both "departments" and indi-
viduals employed within or by those departments constitute "organs of
state." In United States law, "generally, a public employee acts under
color of state law while acting in his official capacity or while exercising
his responsibilities pursuant to state law."'17 Moreover, as the Supreme
Court indicated in West v. Atkins, where it found that a prison physician
was a state actor, it appears to make no difference whether the state's
agent is "on the state payroll or is paid by contract," or is working full-
time or part-time. 18 The doctor in question had been employed by the
state to meet its "constitutional obligation" to provide prison inmates
with medical care.' 9 In these circumstances, to allow the form of the
contractual or employment relationship to alter the reach of the con-
stitution would, as the Court observed, leave the state "'free to contract
out all services which it is constitutionally obligated to provide and
leave its citizens with no means for vindication of those rights, whose
protection has been delegated to 'private' actors, when they have been
denied."' 20 This logic strongly suggests that not only employees of
South Africa's own government departments but also consultants hired
by contract to assist in performing the state's constitutional duties
should be viewed as organs of state while they perform in such
capacities.2 '
had to be terminated and the land in question would revert to the testator's heirs.
Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970).
17. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 50 (1988). The phrase "under color of law" is a
statutory one, but "[f]or most purposes, the inquiry whether challenged conduct is
'under color of law' within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §1983 [the relevant statute] is the
same as the inquiry whether the challenged conduct is 'state action.'" Tribe, supra note
5, at 1703 n.2.
18. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. at 56.
19. Id. at 52 n.10, 54-55.
20. Id. at 56 n.14, quoting the dissenting opinion in the court below, West v. At-
kins, 815 F.2d 993, 998 (4"' Cir. 1987) (Winter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
21. The Supreme Court has identified only one exception to the general rule that
state employees are state actors, and that exception involves truly special circumstances,
namely the work of a criminal defense lawyer paid by the state to represent indigents,
"when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a crimi-
nal proceeding," Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981). In that role, the
lawyer is paid by the state "to act in a role independent of and in opposition to the
state," West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. at 50.
I do not mean to suggest, however, that every individual or entity under contract
with the state is therefore essentially a state employee and an organ of state. Govern-
[Vol. 45
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"[A]ny other functionary or institution," however, may also in-
clude entities not employed by the state (both juristic persons such as
corporations, and individual people) who perform functions or exer-
cise powers - call them "public functions," for short - in terms of the
constitution or legislation. Indeed, a wide range of roles might be un-
derstood as public functions. United States decisions on state action
have explored the contours of a "public function" argument, under
which private actors in some circumstances are held to be state actors
because of the task they are carrying out. The leading examples are a
company town, a privately owned municipality which was held subject
to the constitution's protection of free speech against state limita-
tion,22 and the organizers of whites-only political primaries, who were
held subject to the constitution's bar to racial discrimination by the
state.23 The problem with this line of argument is that governments do
a lot of things, and if every private actor who is engaged in action gov-
ernments also engage in is therefore a state actor, the sphere of private
action will be dramatically contracted. On this ground, essentially, cur-
rent American doctrine suggests that for a public function argument
to succeed, the function in question must be one that is traditionally
and exclusively performed by governments. 24
But the United States constitution is not South Africa's, and the
public function doctrine should not be as circumscribed in South Af-
rica as it is in the United States. South Africa's constitution points to-
ward a broader reading of "public function," by making the righting of
injustices of private power, as well as of socioeconomic wrongs that are
the result of both public and private acts, a constitutional duty of the
state.25 If providing access to housing is a constitutional obligation of
the state, after all, it is surely also a public function. More precisely, for
here my shorthand term "public function" is imprecise, the provision
ments contract with a tremendous range of suppliers of goods and services, and a rule
that de-privatized everyone with such a contract would be much too broad. My point
here is that those contracting parties who have, in substance, contracted to become part
of the government should be treated as such. Determining the proper treatment of
other contracting parties depends on a more nuanced examination of their situation,
including their relations to the state, an examination which I suggest should be carried
out under the rubric of s 8(2) rather than of s 239.
22. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
23. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
24. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 157-64 (1978).
25. In addition to the socioeconomic rights provisions themselves, see ss 9(4)
(mandating legislation barring private discrimination); 23 (guaranteeing the right to
fair labor practices, and protecting trade union and employer rights); 25(5), (6) & (9)
(mandating land reform); and 32 (1) & (2) (mandating legislation to enforce, inter
alia, the right to information held by private actors).
2000-2001]
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW
of access to housing is surely a "function in terms of the Constitution,"
in the language of section 239(b) (i) - for with respect to constitu-
tional functions the text implies either that all such functions are in-
trinsically public or that their public or private status is irrelevant to
the recognition that those who perform them are organs of state.
In striking contrast, the United States constitution as currently
read does not even oblige government to protect individuals from
each other's violent attacks, much less to rectify conditions of private
exploitation. 26 Indeed, the United States constitution has at times
been interpreted to affirmatively insulate some exercises of private
power over others from governmental interference. Protecting employ-
ees' rights as against employers, for example, was at one time seen as a
breach of "due process," a notion that required interpretive vigor to
sustain.2 7 Much more plausibly, the rights of contracting parties
against each other have received some protection under the clause of
the constitution forbidding states from impairing the obligation of
contracts.
2 8
It might be thought that a reading of "public function" in light of
the socioeconomic duties which the South African constitution gives to
the government would mean, for example, that every person building
a house for low-income purchasers is an "organ of state" engaged in
performing, in terms of the constitution, the function of providing ac-
cess to adequate housing. This conception would virtually erase any
distinction between private and public activity, however, and it should
be looked at very critically on that ground alone.2 9
I would suggest that the crucial limit on an expansive reading of
section 239(b) with regard to socioeconomic rights should not be to
deny that the provision of socioeconomic benefits is a public function
- for clearly it is a public function when the state performs it, as it is
constitutionally mandated to do - but rather to carefully define what
it means to exercise a power or perform a function "in terms of' consti-
26. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189
(1989).
27. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
28. U.S. Const., art. I, §10, cl. I ("No State shall... pass any... Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts"). The leading modern case, dramatically limiting the force of
this clause, is Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
29. We should be especially skeptical of dramatic expansions of the categories of
seemingly private actors who constitute organs of state if, as Stuart Woolman has sug-
gested, the Constitution may tend to be applied more stringently to those covered by
this category than to other private actors whose private-ness is more marked and who
therefore are subject to the Constitution (if at all) only via s 8(2). See Woolman, supra
note 6, at 10-65.
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tutional or legislative provisions.30 If "in terms of' means simply "as
authorized by," then anyone engaged in the provision of socioeco-
nomic goods in accordance with constitutional or statutory provisions
will be an organ of state - again, a preposterous result, since vast
spheres of conduct in modem societies must be carried out in accor-
dance with law, and in particular statutory law.3 ' American state action
doctrine has repeatedly recognized that the mere fact that the state has
authorized some private conduct does not make that conduct attribu-
table to the state itself.3 2 Especially because section 8(2) remains avail-
able to handle the question of the Bill of Rights' applicability to cases
of less direct connection to the state, it seems appropriate to read "in
terms of" strictly - to mean, essentially, that the actor is exercising a
power granted quite specifically to him or her (or it) by the constitu-
tion or statute.3 3 General grants, on the other hand - say, a grant of
30. Both "public" and "function" do, however, deserve some interpretive atten-
tion. Lisa Thornton suggests that the word "public" was added to what became s
239(b) (ii) during the drafting process "to exclude, for example, companies registered
in terms of the Companies Act" Lisa Thornton, The Constitutional Right to Just Adminis-
trativeAction -Are Political Parties Bound?, 15 S. AFR.J. ON HUM. Rrs. 351, 355 (1999). In
some contexts, a proper understanding of "function" may be particularly important.
The Bill of Rights protects the exercise of many human freedoms, and it might be
possible to characterize parental care, for example (see s 28(1) (b)), or political organiz-
ing (sees 19(1)) as the performance of constitutional "functions," but we should not do
so. The enjoyment of liberty should not be equated per se with the performance of state
functions - although some people (civil servants, for example) will choose to exercise
their liberty by becoming, unmistakably, state functionaries.
31. As the late justice Mahomed observed in Du Plessis v. De Klerk, 1996 (3) S.A.
850, 894 (CC), there may today not be "any right which exists which is not ultimately
sourced in some law."
32. SeeJackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 355-57 (1974); Welling-
ton, supra note 3, at 352. At some points, however, and notably during the struggle
against racial segregation and discrimination in the 1950s and 1960s, the Supreme
Court did seem to approach the view that some authorizations of private conduct were
unconstitutional state action. See Kenneth L. Karst & Harold W. Horowitz, Reitman v.
Muley: A Telophase of Substantive Equal Protection, 1967 Sup. CT. REV. 39, 55-80. Today,
mere permission will not suffice, but sufficient state "encouragement" will turn the en-
couraged private acts into state action. See notes 123 - 126 infra and accompanying text.
33. An example would be the power of the Society of Advocates to seek court
orders striking people from the advocates' roll, a power conferred by statute (though
recognised at common law as well). See De Freitas and Another v. Society of Advocates
of Natal & Another, 1998 (11) B.C.L.R. 1345 (CC). Another example might be some of
the roles played by political parties in South Africa, as Thornton argues. See Thornton,
supra note 30, at 355-56.
It is conceivable that unions' exercise of authority over their members could also
be seen as an exercise of specifically granted power. The Supreme Court entertained a
similar idea in the 1940s, in the face of unions' discrimination against African-Ameri-
cans. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., 323 U.S. 192, 198 (1944). Dean Wel-
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authority to use reasonable force to eject an unwelcome guest from
one's home - would not convert everyone who used them into state
actors.
34
How would this definition work? The builder of a single-family
dwelling for a low-income buyer is engaged in doing something that
the constitution welcomes, and in an area where the state is under con-
stitutional responsibility, and so that builder might be found to be per-
forming a public function. He or she would not, however, be
performing that function in terms of the constitution, or in terms of
the various pieces of legislation that no doubt specify various require-
ments for home building, because none of these sources of law should
be regarded as granting the builder a power to build houses. These
laws, after all, do not grant any power to this builder specifically.
Rather, it seems more appropriate to view these legal provisions as reg-
ulating the builder's exercise of a right, namely the right under section
22 of the constitution to engage in a trade, occupation or profession
subject to regulation.3 5 Even if the builder actually could not work at
all without some sort of builder's license, I would urge that the grant of
licenses whose primary function is simply to admit recipients to some
lawful profession, rather than to charge them with some particular re-
sponsibilities within state programs, should not be viewed as satisfying
section 239(b). Otherwise, everyone who does anything pursuant to a
license - even, presumably, a driver's license - could be regarded as an
organ of state.3 6
lington's conclusion was that other means were available for addressing unions'
pernicious use of race, and that therefore dislodging of state action principles for this
purpose would be a mistake. Wellington, supra note 3, at 372. Alternative means are
available in South Africa as well, since s 8(2) of South Africa's constitution permits the
imposition of constitutional duties on unions, or any other actors, without the necessity
of characterizing them as organs of state. But s 239(b) is also part of South Africa's
constitution, and there may be circumstances where unions' roles deserve to be recog-
nized as governmental.
34. It may initially seem odd that the more general the grant, the less "public" the
power. But "the people" are not "the state."
35. Exercise of constitutional rights is not, in itself, performance of a constitu-
tional function. See note 30 supra.
36. For an application of this reasoning to find that a private, racially discrimina-
tory club which operated under, and with the aid of, a license authorizing it to sell
liquor, was not thereby engaged in state action, see Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407
U.S. 163 (1972). Similarly, a corporate charter ordinarily should not make its recipient
a state actor, although at earlier stages in Anglo-American history corporations were
evidently chartered one by one, for specific purposes, and thus might have been organs
of state under the argument in the text. See Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Constitutional Limitations
on Corporate Activity - Protections of Personal Rights from Invasion Through Economic Power,
100 U. PA. L. REv. 933, 944-45 (1952). In the United States today, even quite specific
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Suppose, however, that the builder acts under legislation that is
directly concerned with overcoming South Africa's chronic housing
shortage. If, say, the builder constructs houses that do not comply with
normal code requirements, and that are permitted only as part of a
program of low-income housing construction created by statute, is the
builder performing the public function of increasing access to hous-
ing, in terms of this legislation? This is surely a closer call, and even
closer if the builder is receiving government funds to do the work.
Even here, however, I would suggest that if the builder is simply one of
many contractors engaged in this effort, it should probably not be
treated as an organ of state. Such a builder might well be properly
subject to constitutional limitations, but it will make more sense to ex-
plicitly address all the relevant considerations bearing on this choice,
as section 8(2) invites the courts to do, than to shoehorn this builder
into the awkward-fitting category of "organ of state." But if, for exam-
ple, a single builder or builders' association contracts to implement a
province's low-income housing program, then it might well be appro-
priate to see that entity as having the kind of responsibility - and
power - that qualify it as an organ of state.
I would also argue, however, that another possible limiting con-
struction of section 239(b)'s "in terms of' requirement should be re-
jected. This argument would have it that no one acts "in terms of' law
unless he or she acts in compliance with the law in question. This,
indeed, was the interpretation given to similar language in the impor-
tant 1980s case of Minister of Law and Order and Others v. Hurley and
Another.3 7 The effect of that ruling, however, was to preserve the juris-
diction of the courts to review police misconduct. A similar ruling here
would circumscribe the power of the courts to apply the constitution's
mandates, and would do so precisely in those cases where such applica-
tion is likely to be most needed - where the actors in question are
exceeding their constitutional or statutory authorization. In a related
context, the United States Supreme Court ruled forty years ago that
police officers' conduct could be considered "under color of law" and
subject to constitutional challenge even if the same conduct was actu-
ally in violation of the state laws under which the police were author-
charters - such as the incorporation under federal law of the United States Olympic
Committee - do not by themselves make the chartered entities state action. San Fran-
cisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee, 483 U.S. 522, 543 n.23
(1987).
37. 1986 (3) S.A. 549 (A). For an extended discussion of this case and the tech-
niques of statutory interpretation employed in South African law, see STEPHEN
ELLMANN, IN A TIME OF TRouBLE: LAW AND LIBERTY IN SoUTH AFRICA'S STATE OF EMER-
GENCY 26-56 (1992).
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ized to operate. 38 That ruling preserved the force of the United States
constitution's dictates, and a similar reading of section 239(b) would
be equally appropriate.39
II. SECTION 8(2) AND THE APPLICATION OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS TO
ACTORS OUTSIDE THE STATE
A. The constitution's acceptance of horizontality
In Du Plessis v. De Klerk, the Constitutional Court ruled that the
interim constitution 40 did not provide for the direct application of the
rights it guaranteed to the relations of private individuals in general.4 1
But the new constitution differs on this score from the one it replaced,
in several significant respects. First, it eliminates the interim constitu-
tion's failure to include the judiciary among the institutions of govern-
ment bound by the Bill of Rights - a feature of the earlier document
that the Du Plessis v. De Klerk court emphasized. 42 Second, it explicitly
gives the Constitutional Court the authority to refashion rules of the
common law; 43 again, the Du Plessis v. De Klerk court had emphasized
its lack of this power under the interim constitution, in denying that
that constitution directly operated on rules of the common law as they
38. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961). Even Justice Frankfurter, the lone
dissenter in this case, agreed that systematic violations of state law - as distinguished
from isolated breaches which the states might be assumed to be able to address - would
be under color of law. See id. at 236 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See also Home Tel. &
Tel. v. Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278, 289 (1913) (where a state officer violates the Four-
teenth Amendment by acts "which there would not be opportunity to perform but for
the possession of some state authority," the courts must "assur [e] that the officer pos-
sessed power" to act).
39. Cf. Skhosana and Others v. C D Roos T/A Roos Se Oord and Others, No.
LCC50/99 (Land Claims Court, April 20, 1999), at 15, 18 (holding that "acting in
terms of ESTA" [the Extension of Security of Tenure Act] means acting "within the
sphere of law established by this Act"; this purposive interpretation appears to give the
Land Claims Court "jurisdiction to review cases which fell to be dealt with in conformity
with ESTA, but were not so dealt with").
40. See note 2 supra.
41. Du Plessis and Others v. De Klerk and Another, 1996 (3) S.A. 850 (CC).
42. S 8(1); see Du Plessis v. De Klerk, 1996 (3) S.A. at 877 (judgment of Kentridge
AJ). Three justices (Chaskalson P, O'ReganJ and LangaJ) concurred explicitly in Ken-
tridge AJ's judgment; three others (Ackermann J, Mokgoro J and Sachs J) separately
expressed their general agreement with this judgment.
43. S 173 (for a discussion of this section, see Chris Sprigman & Michael Osborne,
Du Plessis Is Not Dead: South Africa's 1996 Constitution and the Application of the Bill of
Rights to Private Disputes, 15 So. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTs. 25, 37 (1999)); see also s 8(3).
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applied between private individuals. 44 Third, the new constitution ex-
plicitly, or in some cases almost explicitly, makes certain rights applica-
ble to private actors,45 and contains several other guarantees that
either bind private actors or at least oblige the state to regulate private
actors' behavior.46
Fourth, and most obviously, the new constitution contains section
8. Section 8(2), as we have seen, states the circumstances in which
rights bind private actors. Though it does not tell us which rights bind
which actors, and instead says rights bind "if, and to the extent that,"
they are applicable, its phrasing seems more prescriptive than condi-
tional. It does not say that "rights may apply" in certain circumstances,
but rather that they do. Moreover, section 8(3) goes on to specify how
courts are to develop the law "[w] hen applying a provision of the Bill
of Rights to a natural or juristic person in terms of subsection (2)";
again, the import of the phrasing is that there will actually be such
cases. For these reasons, it does not seem correct to read the new Con-
stitution as "simply defer[ring] the question of application";47 the text
is, rather, an invitation to such application. What the invitation leaves
very much to the courts, however, is the elaboration of the proper oc-
44. 1996 S.A. (3) at 880-81 (judgment of Kentridge AJ).
45. These include ss 9(4) (banning unfair discrimination by any person); 15(2)
(authorizing religious services at state-aided - but presumably private - institutions,
provided that they meet several requirements); 29(3) (prohibiting race discrimination
even by private schools); 30 (protecting language and culture rights, but specifying that
"no one exercising these rights may do so in a manner inconsistent with any provision
of the Bill of Rights"); 31 (similarly protecting, but limiting, the rights of "cultural,
religious and linguistic communities"); and 32(1) (b) (guaranteeing the right of access
to information held by private persons). Two of these, ss 9(4) and 32(1) (b), are linked
to provisions for legislative enforcement, but even if these accompanying provisions
embody a preference for legislative rather than judicial enforcement - see Sprigman &
Michael Osborne, HR-25 supra note 43, at 38-40 - the other sections have no such
legislative action provisions.
46. These include ss 12(1) (c) (guaranteeing the right "to be free from all forms of
violence from either public or private sources"); 23 (labour relations, including rights
to organize and engage in collective bargaining); 25 (6) & (7) (property rights guaran-
tees to those who lost such rights "as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or
practices"); 26(3) (protection against eviction); 27(3) (emergency medical treatment);
and 28 (children's rights, including the rights to family care or parental care, and to
protection from neglect or abuse). For identification and discussion of a number of the
provisions cited in this note and note 45 supra, see Halton Gheadle & Dennis Davis, The
Application of the 1996 Constitution in the Private Sphere, 13 So. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTs. 44, 59
(1997).
47. Sprigman & Osborne, supra note 43, at 30.
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casions for this horizontal application, and of the proper methods of
carrying it out.
B. The risks of accepting the invitation to horizontality
1. The guidance of the constitutional text
It is important to recognize that the constitution's invitation to
horizontality is not unhesitating. There is, after all, no doubt whatso-
ever under section 8(1) that the Bill of Rights applies to the govern-
ment. In contrast, section 8(2) says that the Bill of Rights binds private
actors "if, and to the extent that, it is applicable." One cannot read the
words just quoted without drawing the inference that the Bill of Rights
may sometimes not apply to private actors, or sometimes not apply to
them to the same extent as it does to the state. Moreover, section 239
offers more evidence of the "state-centered" focus of the constitution.
This section expands the boundaries of the state to encompass some
entities not self-evidently governmental, but the private actors it char-
acterizes as "organs of state" are clearly those with links to the state, in
the form of public responsibilities assigned to them by constitutional
or statutory provisions.
None of this is surprising. The South African constitution's Bill of
Rights was written against a background of rights protection in other
constitutions. What the South African scholar Alfred Cockrell has
called the "orthodox view" has been that the special concern of consti-
tutional rights was with protection of citizens against the state. 48 The
United States is, of course, one adherent of this view, with the permu-
tations of our state action doctrine marking the extent to which we
have departed from an exclusive focus on the conduct of the govern-
ment.49 Canada's Supreme Court has ruled that the Canadian Charter
does not apply to common law rules in litigation between private par-
ties. 50 Germany too has largely eschewed direct application of its Basic
Law rights provisions to private actors, though it has embraced a pow-
48. Alfred Cockrell, Private Law and the Bill of Rights: A Threshold Issue of 'Horizontal-
ity", in THE BILL OF RIGHTS COMPENDIUM at 3A-3 (1996).
49. For the Constitutional Court's account of the comparative constitutional juris-
prudence of the United States, Ireland, Canada and Germany, see Du Plessis v. De
Klerk, 1996 (3) SA at 871-75.
50. Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, Local 580 v. Dolphin Delivery
Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573, 592-603.
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erful form of "indirect application."51 The "orthodox view" is shift-
ing,52 and clearly the South African framers intended to depart from it
51. Peter Quint explains the German practice in an illuminating article, Peter E.
Quint, Free Speech and Private Law in German Constitutional Theory, 48 MD. L. Rxv. 247
(1989). Quint writes that the German Constitutional Court held in the Luth case, 7
BVerfGE 198 (1958), that "the Basic Law establishes an 'objective ordering of values,'"
Quint, supra, at 261. Quint continues:
Yet even though the Court acknowledged that the constitution must
play a role in private law, it also made clear that constitutional rights do not
ordinarily have the same impact in private law disputes as when those rights
are asserted against the state in public law controversies. In reaching this
conclusion the Court adopted what has come to be known as the doctrine
of the 'indirect' effect of constitutional values on private legal relations ....
In a public law action between an individual and the state, a constitutional
right can directly override an otherwise applicable rule of public law. In
private law disputes between individuals, in contrast, constitutional rights
were said to 'influence' rules of civil law rather than actually to override
them.... In such cases the rules of private law are to be interpreted and
applied in light of the applicable constitutional norm, but it is nonetheless
the civil law rules that are ultimately to be applied.
.... The Court's 'indirect' theory therefore imposes an obligation on
the lower courts to use their powers creatively to alter or adapt a rule of the
civil law when a constitutional value is implicated. A substantial tension re-
mains, however, between the force of the private law values and the influ-
ence of constitutional norms.
Id. at 262-64 (footnotes omitted). Remarkably, the doctrine of indirect application "may
even lead, in some circumstances, to something that looks very much like the judicial
creation of a constitutional tort action by one private person against another private
person to redress a constitutional violation." Id. at 275. At the same time, Germany's
Constitutional Court approaches the review of the private law decisions of the ordinary
courts with a considerable measure of deference. Id. at 319-29.
52. Germany, even though it has not generally endorsed direct application of con-
stitutional rights provision to private actors, still represents a distinct shift from the
American approach, since, in Peter Quint's words, "[the underlying German theory
appears to reject the problematic view that it is possible to separate the public from the
private realm. At very least, the German view is skeptical of the position that the funda-
mental law should apply only to the 'public' realm, even assuming that such a realm can
be clearly delineated." Id., at 340. Similarly, Canada rejected direct application of the
constitution to private parties' disputes at common law in Dolphin Delivery, [1986] 2
S.C.R. 573, but Murray Hunt points out that the same case also approved "apply[ing]
and develop [ing] the principles of the common law in a manner consistent with the
fundamental values enshrined in the Constitution," id. at 603, and suggests, in light of
another case, "how paper-thin the distinction may be between 'extending' or 'modify-
ing' the common law in order to make it comply with Charter values, which is permissi-
ble, and making 'far-reaching changes' to the common law, which is not." Murray
Hunt, The "Horizontal Effect" of the Human Rights Act, [1998] PUB. L. 423, 430, 432.
Other nations' approaches to the horizontality issue range from embrace to rejec-
tion, with uncertainty apparently one of the intermediate stops. In Ireland, Andrew
Butler writes, "it seems clear that the constitutional guarantees of the Bunreacht [the
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Irish constitution] are applicable to private litigation." Andrew S. Butler, Constitutional
Rights in Private Litigation: A Critique and Comparative Analysis, 22 ANGLO-AMER. L. REV. 1,
18 (1993). Hunt comments that Ireland "appears to be unique in recognising an
independent cause of action against private parties for breach of certain constitution-
ally protected rights." Hunt, supra, at 428.
Countries that appear to accept some measure of constitutional influence on pri-
vate law include: Belgium, see Andr6 Alen &Jan Clement, Fundamental Rights and Liber-
ties, in TREATISE ON BELGIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 187 370 (Andr6 Alen ed. 1992)
(noting statutory provision for damages for private violations of constitutional rights,
and observing that "[t]he opinion gains more and more ground that there may be
some kind of 'Drittwirkung' [the German term for horizontality] of fundamental rights
in Belgium"); Costa Rica, see Rub6n Herndndez Valle, Costa Rica, in 2 INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAw/CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 105 405 (2000) ("With regard to efficacy,
the fundamental rights are binding not only on the public power, including legislators,
but also on other citizens"); Estonia, see Raul Nerits & Kalle Merusk, Estonia, in 2 INTER-
NATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAv/CONsTITUTIONAL LAv 182 1 240, 186 T1 246, 190 1 249
(1998) (arguing that the Estonian constitution should be read to bind private individu-
als, directly or indirectly); Greece, see PHILIPPOS C. SPYROPOULOS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
IN HELLAS 128 389 (1995) (Greek courts "waver between" recognizing application of
constitutional rights to third parties and rejecting it); Japan, see HIRoYuKI HATA & Go
NAKAGAWA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF JAPAN 109-10 (1997) (citing and endorsing Japa-
nese cases of "indirect application" of constitutional rights to private disputes, while
noting that certain Japanese constitutional provisions "apparently stipulate that they are
directly applicable between private parties"); perhaps Malta, see ANDREW CLAPHAM,
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PRIVATE SPHERE 93 n.17 (1993) (Malta's European Convention
Act 1987 contains "no limitation . . . restricting claims against private individuals");
Namibia, see Du Plessis v. De Klerk, 1996 (3) S.A. 850, 877 91 45 (quoting NAMIB. CONST.
art. 5: "The fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in this chapter shall be
respected and upheld by the Executive, Legislature and Judiciary and all organs of the
Government and its agencies and, where applicable to them, by all natural and legal
persons in Namibia, and shall be enforceable by the Courts in the manner hereinafter
prescribed") (noted by Woolman, supra note 6, at 10-15 n.14); the Netherlands, see CON-
STANTIN A.J.M. KORTMANN & PAUL P.T. BOVEND'EERT, DUTCH CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 147
91 358 (2000) ("[flundamental rights only enter into the relationships between citizens
indirectly, in interpreting open legal concepts such as the civil law concept of good
faith," although "during the constitutional reform of 1983 .... [t]he government as-
serted that fundamental rights could also operate between one citizen and another");
Romania, see Mihai Constantinescu & Victor Dan ZlAtescu, Romania, in 4 INTERNA-
TIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAWS/CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 112 91 293 (1996) (under
Romania's constitutional provision for equality before the law, "citizens are equally
treated... by both public authorities and any other subjects, whether natural orjuridi-
cal persons"); and Spain, see EUROPEAN COMMISSION FOR DEMOCRACY THROUGH LAW,
BULLETIN No. 3 at 444-45 (1999) (summarizing an unnamed 1999 decision of the Span-
ish Constitutional Court, Second Chamber, which held that an employer dismissing an
employee for initiating legal proceedings against the employer violated the employee's
constitutional right to "effective protection by the courts"); EUROPEAN COMMISSION FOR
DEMOCRACY THROUGH LAW, BULLETIN No. 1 at 158-59 (2000) (summarizing Santiago
Aldazdbal G6mez v. Casino de La Toja, a 2000 decision of the Spanish Constitutional
Court, First Chamber, which found that a casino company's installation of surveillance
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equipment to monitor its employees potentially violated the employees' constitutional
right to "personal privacy").
Perhaps most startlingly, the United Kingdom, which until recently did not have a
Bill of Rights as such at all, now has enacted the Human Rights Act of 1998, which
apparently is meant to provide at least some measure of horizontality. The Lord Chan-
cellor stated during the Parliamentary consideration of this law that "[w]e... believe
that it is right as a matter of principle for the courts to have the duty of acting compati-
bly with the [European Convention on Human Rights] not only in cases involving other
public authorities but also in developing the common law in deciding cases between
individuals." Hunt, supra, at 440 (quoting 583 PARE. DEB., H.L., Nov. 24, 1997, col 783);
but cf Gareth Davies, The 'Horizontal" Effects of the Human Rights Act, 150 NEw L.J. 839,
839 (2000) (maintaining that the Act's potential horizontal effect came about
"[p]erhaps accidentally, perhaps deliberately"). For further discussion of the extent of
horizontal application of the United Kingdom's Human Rights Act of 1998, see
Nicholas Bamforth, The Application of the Human Rights Act 1998 to Public Authorities and
Private Bodies, 58 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 159 (1999); Clive Walker & Russell L. Weaver, The
United Kingdom Bill of Rights 1998: The Modernisation of Rights in the Old World, 33 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 497, 540-41 (2001).
For an extended argument that the European Convention on Human Rights cre-
ates rights that apply to private actors - even though only States can be held liable for
violations before the European Court of Human Rights - see C APHAM, supra, at 178-
244. The case Clapham calls "the strongest indication so far that the European Court of
Human Rights will intervene and hold States responsible for violations of rights where
the actor involved was a private individual," id. at 213-14, is X and Yv. The Netherlands,
8 Eur. CL H.R. (ser. A) at 235 (1985), in which the Court observed that Article 8 of the
European Convention, which protects private and family life, may impose on states not
only a duty "to abstain from.. interference" but also "positive obligations inherent in
an effective respect for private or family life. These obligations may involve the adop-
tion of measures designed to secure respect for private life even in the sphere of the
relations of individuals between themselves." Id. at 23940 23.
Countries that appear to maintain a stricter insistence that the constitution applies
only to state action include: Austria, see KURT HET R, OUTLINE OF AusriAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAw 43 (1989) (noting that "the Austrian Constitutional Court has ruled that
the purpose of the fundamental rights is the protection against the state and that a
constitutional provision has no direct effect on third parties," and then observing that
"[t]his ruling is highly disputed in the doctrine"); Hong Kong, see Hunt, supra, at 427
(citing a Hong Kong Court of Appeal ruling that Hong Kong's Bill of Rights Ordinance
1991 "has no application to a dispute between private individuals"); India, see Woolman,
supra note 6, at 10-23 n.1; Shamdasani v. Central Bank of India, 39 AI.R,. (S.C.) 59
(1951) (finding that two constitutional provisions guaranteeing the right to property
were not "intended to prevent wrongful individual acts or to provide protection against
merely private conduct"); but cf. D.K. Agarwal, India, in 3 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF LAws/CoNsTrruoNAL LAw 52 43 (1993) ("In its anxiousness to see that the State
observes the sanctity of the fundamental rights, the Supreme Court has extended the
definition of State. ... [to include] a public corporation or a government company or
even a cooperative society"); New Zealand, see A.H. Angelo & Rosemary Gordon, New
Zealand, in 4 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAXWs/CoNsTrrUTIONAL LAw 160 390
(1997) ("It is questionable whether [New Zealand's Bill of Rights Act] extends beyond
agents [of the state] to private parties"); and Zimbabwe, see Greg Linington, Zimbabwe,
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to some extent. Equally clearly, the document they wrote still reflects
that tradition. Application of the constitution to private entities still
calls for special attention and special justification, pursuant to section
8(2).
If there were no good reason for the constitution's hesitation, it
would be tempting to disregard the text's implications. In fact, how-
ever, there are two substantial considerations, each implicating consti-
tutional values, that confirm the wisdom of carefully assessing the
application of constitutional rights to bind private actors. These are
the potential impact of horizontal application of the constitution for
the separation of powers within the government and for private order-
ing outside it.
2. The impact on the separation of powers
Too ready an application of the Bill of Rights via section 8(2)
could in effect alter the balance of lawmaking responsibility and power
between the courts and Parliament.53 Suppose, for example, that all
builders who contract with the government to build low-income hous-
ing are, without more, considered subject to the Bill of Rights under
section 8(2). In that case, a host of questions about each builder's con-
duct would become constitutional issues. Has the builder restricted
employees' freedom of speech, or denied their freedom to use the lan-
guage they prefer? Does the worksite damage the environment? Are
work rules a breach of employees' privacy? Does negligence by the
in 5 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAws/CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 240 572 (2000)
("To date Zimbabwean courts have always construed provisions in the Declaration of
Rights in purely vertical terms.... The courts have not directly considered the question
of whether any of the provisions in the Declaration apply horizontally as well").
In the context of the substantial movement towards horizontality elsewhere in the
world, it is startling to read the recent decision of the Sixth Circuit in Chapman v.
Higbee Co., 256 F.3d 416 (6th Cir.), vacated and rehearing en bane granted, 270 F.3d 297
(6th Cir. 2001). There the circuit court panel held, over a vigorous dissent, that a 1991
amendment to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994), which declared that "[t]he rights protected by
this section [1981] are protected against impairment by nongovernmental discrimina-
tion and impairment under color of law," 42 U.S.C. § 1981(c) (1994), had no applica-
tion to the portion of 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (1994) which guaranteed to everyone in the
United States "the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of
persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens." The panel maintained that "be-
cause the state is the sole source of the law, it is only the state that can deny the full and
equal benefit of the law." Chapman, 256 F.3d at 421.
53. The separation of powers problem is thoughtfully explored by Chris Sprigman
and Michael Osborne in their article, supra note 43, though I do not consider this
problem as intractable as they do.
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builder or the employees interfere with potential buyers' access to ade-
quate housing?
These are all important questions, but they are also the sorts of
questions that, in the absence of constitutional mandates, will be an-
swered through the political process, in legislation, or through com-
mon law adjudication that is subject to legislative correction. If they are
constitutional questions, however, then they may require judicial an-
swers that determine the meaning of the constitution, and such an-
swers will be beyond the reach of legislative override except by
constitutional amendment. 54
One result may be the impairment of majority rule. In reasonably
well-functioning democracies, with elected political officials and ajudi-
ciary structurally insulated from direct political influence, legislatures
are the institutions designed to express the range of sentiments of the
people. They may fail in this responsibility, but it is not likely that the
judiciary will do better. On this ground, it has been argued that South
Africa's Bill of Rights should not be directly applied to private actors,
since doing so will inevitably entail the weighing of one private actor's
rights against another's, and "the enterprise of ranking rights requires
a political choice, and political choice in a democracy is the terrain of
54. South Africa's Bill of Rights is easier to amend than its American counterpart,
since amendment requires only approval by two-thirds of each house of Parliament,
under s 74(2). The governing party, the African National Congress, holds slightly less
than two-thirds of the seats in the principal house of Parliament, the National Assembly.
As in the United States, political leaders might also try to change constitutional law
through appointments to the Constitutional Court. The members of this Court serve
nonrenewable terms of no more than 15 years, pursuant to s 176 (1) (as amended in
November 2001, see Carmel Rickard, New ChiefJustice by Month-end Parliament Passes New
Bil, SUNDAY TIMEs, Nov. 4, 2001 (available at http://www.suntimes.co.2a/business/le-
gal/2001/11/04/carmel02.asp, visited Dec. 4, 2001)). The President must nominate
most new members of the Court from lists of candidates submitted by ajudicial Services
Commission, as prescribed by s 174 (4); the Commission includes both political appoin-
tees and a number of representatives of the judiciary and the legal profession, specified
in s 178 (1).
In principle, it seems important to the growth of a strong constitutional order in
South Africa that neither of these possible tools for overriding the decisions of the
Constitutional Court be utilized often. The greater the constitutionalization of ordinary
legal matters, however, the greater will be the temptation for the political branches to
regain control of these issues by tactics such as these.
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legislatures, not courts. '55 Moreover, the constitution itself by no
means spells out which rights should prevail over others.56
I would not take these arguments so far. The constitution itself
represents a political choice by the South African people, and arguably
a more profound choice than those reflected in the day-to-day prefer-
ences of ordinary politics. 57 South Africa's Constitutional Assembly
chose to invite some measure of horizontal application of the Bill of
Rights to private actors, even though each expansion of the sphere of
constitutional adjudication limits legislative prerogatives. Similarly, the
Constitutional Assembly chose to adopt a series of socioeconomic
rights provisions, even though clearly these provisions risk limiting leg-
islative choices. Unless these provisions are merely precatory, South
Africa's courts have been charged with a responsibility, however peril-
ous it may be. Indeed, to fail to undertake the application of the Bill of
Rights that the constitution envisages would itself be an affront to dem-
ocratic principles. None of this makes the argument from democracy
disappear, for, as I have already mentioned, South Africa's framers by
no means fully spelled out - either in connection with horizontality
or in connection with socioeconomic rights - just how far they
wanted courts to go in making choices that would countermand popu-
lar preferences. Rather, this discussion suggests that South African
courts need to keep the argument from democracy in mind as a cau-
tion, while they proceed to develop the law in these areas.
A second potential result of constitutionalizing spheres of private
activity may be damage to the quality of government decisionmaking.
It is reasonable to believe that elected political officials are, in general,
better equipped than courts to make complex policy judgments and
compromises. American judges, applying a constitution that is strik-
ingly brief, often remind each other that it is not their job or preroga-
tive to be legislators. Although South Africa's constitution is a notably
long document, its Bill of Rights still falls well short of a legislative code
of rights. At a number of points, the drafters quite clearly sought to
place substantial, if not primary, responsibility for working out the de-
tails of rights protection on the legislature - most plainly in connec-
55. Sprigman & Osborne, supra note 43, at 43.
56. Id. Section I's listing of founding values, in particular, falls well short of such a
specification, because the values it embraces are so encompassing.
57. See generally Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution,
93 YALE L.J. 1013 (1984).
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tion with private discrimination, 58 land tenure, 59 freedom of
information,60 and just administrative action.61 The socioeconomic
rights provisions obliging the state to "take reasonable legislative and
other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progres-
sive realisation"62 of these rights also place responsibility and discre-
tion in the legislature.
If, however, private actors are readily brought within the scope of
constitutional guarantees, then the meaning of those guarantees will
be more likely to be fleshed out by the courts. The potential impact on
policymaking discretion may be most striking in connection with socio-
economic rights. If every builder of low-income housing were deemed
subject to constitutional duties, would the courts have to spell out a
code of minimally adequate housing, as part of ruling that a builder of
less than minimally adequate housing was in breach of constitutional
duties? 63 Will the courts need to determine what percentage of a
health care provider's time must be devoted to caring for indigent pa-
tients, as a measure of health care providers' duties under the right to
access to health care?64
58. S 9(4).
59. S 25 (6), (7) & (9).
60. S 32(2).
61. S 33(3). See also s 15 (3) (permitting legislation recognizing traditional or relig-
ious family law and marriages).
62. See ss 26(2), 27(2); cf. ss 24(b), 29(b).
63. In certain limited contexts, American courts have undertaken responsibility
for the details of the provision of socioeconomic rights to particular groups of people,
such as homeless people or involuntarily committed mentally disabled persons or pris-
oners. In the process, they have quite often found themselves promulgating very de-
tailed codes of institutional conduct. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D.
Ala. 1972), af/'d in part, rev'd in part, and remanded by Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305
(5' Cir. 1974) (promulgating minimum standards for treatment of people involuntarily
confined to state mental hospitals).
64. Dean Wellington emphasized the difficulties that would face the Supreme
Court if it modified state action doctrine to apply the First Amendment's protection of
free speech to unions' use of unconsenting members' dues for political advocacy:
[T] his means the Court's immersion in the history, structure, and aspi-
rations of the union movement, and of the particular union. In short, it
means immersion in collective bargaining, and an understanding of the
relationship between economic power and political action.
Thus the task of the court is complicated. And little can be gained
from pastjudicial experience in determining the importance of any partic-
ular union-supported legislative program, and in balancing it with the im-
pact of the union's action on the dissenting employee. Each case will
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To be sure, there are routes by which the courts may mitigate this
problem. If courts are not themselves ideal policymakers, they may be
able to enlist others with greater expertise in the shaping of remedies.
For example, they may largely entrust the choice of remedies to negoti-
ations between the parties themselves. The parties, in turn, may look to
experts; in a prison case, prisoner advocates and government counsel
may both rely extensively on expert opinion from the field of prison
administration as they negotiate comprehensive rules to resolve the
prison's problems. In such negotiations, responsible government offi-
cials may actually acquire leverage enabling them to achieve reforms
that the political process would not have produced unaided. Courts
may also establish various forms of ongoing monitoring and supervi-
sion of the entities under constitutional scrutiny - court "monitors,"
for example, or special masters, or even receivers vested with complete
control of the institutions in question. 65 But these devices are by no
means perfect, and the court orders they generate may be as subject to
calcification and interest-group politics as any other form of
lawmaking. 66
South Africa's constitution, however, provides a way for courts to
mitigate both the infringement on majority rule and the impairment
of policymaking that we have just been considering. The American
scholar Henry Monaghan has called this method "constitutional com-
present the Court with a discrete problem. And even with respect to any
one union the problem will change from time to time with shifts in union
economic power - shifts caused by such factors as changed economic con-
ditions or changed federal and state law. Furthermore, because unions are
very different institutions indeed from States, municipalities or the federal
government for that matter, it will be hard for the Court to transfer the
wisdom contained in traditional first amendment decisions to its review of
union conduct.
Wellington, supra note 3, at 364-66.
If the courts conclude that the relevant constitutional standard dictates a relatively
bright-line rule rather than a contextual approach in a particular area, these difficulties
may be dissipated. See, e.g., Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209, 236
(1977) (holding that First Amendment bars laws authorizing public employee unions to
require employees they represent to pay dues to support "ideological activities unre-
lated to collective bargaining").
65. For a discussion of the process of shaping judicial decrees addressing complex
institutional problems, see Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation,
89 HARV. L. REv. 1281, 1298-1302 (1976).
66. For a recent critique of such judicial interventions, see Ross Sandler & David
Schoenbrod, Government by Decree: The High Cost of Letting Judges Make Policy, CITY JOUR-
NAL, Summer 1994, at 54.
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mon law;" 67 South Africans, borrowing from Germany, call it "indirect
application" of the Constitution. 68 By either name, this approach
avoids the potentially undemocratic and inflexible character of consti-
tutional adjudication by turning instead to development of the com-
mon law guided by constitutional values. The advantage, in the present
context, is that rules of common law can presumably be overridden
freely by legislation. That legislation in turn must be constitutional,
like all other legislation, but the existence of the common law rules
does not fix the constitutional minima, and so the legislature, at least
in theory, would seem to retain just as much lawmaking flexibility after
ajudicial change in the common law as before. Ideally, such common-
law decisionmaking by the courts, "in effect, opens a dialogue with
Congress [or Parliament], but one in which the factor of inertia is now
on the side of individual liberty," as measured in the courts' common-
law decisions. 69
Although indirect application, or constitutional common law, has
much to recommend it, it is not a complete solution to the separation
of powers problems posed by the application of the bill of rights to
private actors. This is so for two quite different reasons.
First, invoking the common law method cannot guarantee the
preservation of legislative flexibility. This reality is reflected in a very
recent U.S. Supreme Court case dealing with an effort by Congress to
override the Miranda rule (which requires police to give specific warn-
ings to criminal suspects concerning their constitutional rights). When
Miranda was decided in 1966, the Supreme Court "opined that the
Constitution would not preclude legislative solutions that differed
from the prescribed Miranda warnings but which were 'at least as effec-
tive in apprising accused persons of their right of silence and in assur-
ing a continuous opportunity to exercise it.'- 70 Just two years later,7 '
Congress enacted legislation that would have made the absence of Mi-
randa warnings not an independent bar to the admission of a confes-
sion into evidence - as the Miranda decision itself provided - but
67. See generally Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court - 1974 Term; Foreword:
Constitutional Common Law, 89 IAtv. L. REv. 1 (1975).
68. Two separate provisions of the Bill of Rights, ss 8(3) and 39(2), envision such
development of the common law in light of constitutional values. Germany's "indirect
application" is described in note 51 supra.
69. Monaghan, supra note 67, at 29.
70. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 440 (2000), (quoting Miranda v. Ari-
zona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966)).
71. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. at 435.
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rather a factor to be considered in a broader inquiry into all the cir-
cumstances surrounding the overall voluntariness of the confession.
The outcome of that inquiry, rather than the absence of Miranda warn-
ings, would determine the confession's admissibility.72 Apparently be-
cause of doubts about its constitutionality, the statute was rarely
utilized, and did not come before the Supreme Court until 2000.73 At
that point, the Court did in fact find the attempted override unconsti-
tutional, on the ground that Congress had simply reinstated a test for
the admissibility of confessions (the "totality of the circumstances" test)
that Miranda had held insufficient.7 4
I welcome this result. Moreover, from the perspective of a consti-
tution such as South Africa's, which explicitly authorizes constitutional
common law, there is nothing in principle unacceptable about the pro-
cess that led to this outcome. 75 But this should still be a somewhat
cautionary story. Congress attempted to override a decision that might
have been overridable, but the executive branch chose not to press the
matter. When the Supreme Court finally confronted the issue, it re-
pulsed the effort to override its decision, in part on the ground that in
the intervening years "Miranda has become embedded in routine po-
lice practice to the point where the warnings have become part of our
national culture. ' 76 One reading of this series of events is that courts
do not necessarily welcome legislative overrides.7 7
If courts find such an interaction with the legislature uncomforta-
ble, the quality of this interaction will be compromised. If Parliament
72. 18 U.S.C. 3501 (1994).
73. Nina Totenberg, Supreme Court Upholds 1966 Miranda Decision, ALL THINGS
CONSIDERED, June 26, 2000 (transcript available on LEXIS).
74. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. at 442-43.
75. Justice Scalia passionately argued in dissent, however, that the United States
constitution does not authorize such decisionmaking. Dickerson v. United States, 530
U.S. at 457-61 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
76. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. at 443.
77. Woolman argues that the dialogue between the branches will be encouraged
by the judiciary's constitutional obligation "to accord the legislative and executive a
certain amount of deference." Woolman, supra note 6, at 10-49. Andrew Butler similarly
maintains that the Irish Supreme Court, operating without the constraint of a state
action doctrine, "has been slow to intervene where either of the other two State organs
[the administration or the legislature] or the common law provide sufficient protection
and vindication for constitutional rights." Butler, supra note 52, at 32. But deference is
not easy to guarantee. American courts also aver that federal statutes come before them
with a presumption of constitutionality. Not every American court is an "activist" court,




does not believe that its efforts to revise constitutional common law will
be upheld, then it presumably will not readily undertake them, and the
dialogue envisioned between the branches will be stifled before it
starts.7 8 Parliament may be particularly hesitant if the courts do not
make clear which elements of their common law decisions they regard
as constitutionally compelled - yet the magic of the common law is
precisely that it does not necessarily require such precision.79 More-
over, a later court may see constitutional necessity in a decision which
its authors considered discretionary. As a practical matter, therefore,
the new, constitutionally-driven common law may well constrain legis-
lative choices and affect judicial assessments of them.
The second difficulty is that, while constitutional common law
may from this perspective be too intrusive on the political branches,
from another perspective, paradoxically, it may not be intrusive
enough. Suppose, for example, that a court were to conclude that the
constitutional values reflected in section 27(1) (b) require that com-
mon law rules of water ownership and use be revised to give priority to
the needs of thirsty people.8 0 The court might render this decision
simply as a matter of common law adjudication under section 39(2),
which calls on every court to "promote the spirit, purport and object of
the Bill of Rights" in "developing the common law." But violators of
the new rules would then be guilty of breaching only the common law,
rather than the constitution; at any rate, a court faithfully confining
itself to applying the common law could not declare a violator to have
acted unconstitutionally, for there would be no constitutional rule in
place on the matter. If private violators of the constitution can some-
times be as great a threat to other men and women as state violators,
however, then the deterrent, stigmatizing effects of the label "constitu-
tional violator" should be available against them. To make those effects
available, a court would need to declare a rule of constitutional, rather
than merely common, law.
This observation presses us to look more closely at section 8(3).
This provision, which has been called a "clawback" from full
78. Monaghan, supra note 67, at 30-31.
79. Monaghan observes that "a busy Court may not, and in any event perhaps
should not, regularly focus upon making such distinctions." Id. at 31.
80. Section 27(1) (b) guarantees everyone "the right to have access to.. .sufficient
food and water."
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horizontality,8 ' tells courts applying the Bill of Rights to private actors
that they "must apply, or if necessary develop, the common law to the
extent that legislation does not give effect to" right in question. Does
this language mean that courts can only reshape the common law, and
cannot also render a holding that the constitution requires this new
common law rule (or some equally efficacious substitute that Parlia-
ment might later devise)? That reading would in effect reinstate much
of the holding of Du Plessis v. De Klerk, since that case had no hesitation
in authorizing precisely this kind of "indirect" application of the Bill of
Rights to private actors by some courts (though not by the Constitu-
tional Court itself).82 Moreover, it might seriously undercut the sym-
bolic force of applications of section 8(2).
Section 8(3), however, need not be read this way. The proper
reading is, I suggest, illuminated by contrasting it with section 39(2).
Both of these provisions deal with development of the common law in
light of constitutional values, and they might be thought to be redun-
dant. What section 8(3) has, and section 39(2) does not, however, is
the opening phrase: "[w] hen applying a provision of the Bill of Rights
to a natural orjuristic person in terms of [section 8(2)]." Section 8(3)
addresses those cases in which the Bill of Rights is actually applied to
private actors by virtue of section 8(2); section 39(2) addresses those
other cases in which the Bill of Rights is not applied, but merely guid-
ing. When the Bill of Rights applies, courts can properly declare what
it means in the case at issue. Not every "application" requires such a
definitive ruling,8 3 but some applications do, and section 8(3) makes
room for them. 84
81. Cockrell, supra note 48, at 3A-14. Woolman, supra note 6, at 10-60, adds that
this language was inserted only at the end ("the last dog days") of the negotiating
process.
82. Du Plessis v. De Klerk, 1996 (3) S.A. at 885; see note 44 supra and accompany-
ing text.
83. There may be some linguistic tension in the idea of courts "applying" the Bill
of Rights without actually saying, each and every time, what the rights guarantees re-
quire. If this is a looser form of "application" than we might normally expect, however, I
believe the flexibility this reading gives in the development of these new areas of consti-
tutional law justifies adopting it. In any event, the term "apply" has considerable play in
its joints, as the phrase "indirect application" reflects.
84. I am sympathetic to Stuart Woolman's view that the power to develop the com-
mon law under s 8(3) includes the power to create new causes of action, "constitutional
torts," based directly on constitutional provisions. See Woolman, supra note 6, at 10-52.
But the argument in text does not go this far; it requires only that the courts be able to
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It is worth pausing to recapitulate the implications of this reading
of sections 8(3) and 39(2). First, there are no legal questions left in
South Africa to which the Bill of Rights is simply and inherently irrele-
vant. Section 39(2) makes clear that courts are obliged to promote
constitutional values "[w]hen interpreting any legislation, and when
developing the common law or customary law." Sections 8(3) and
39(2) together imply, however, that there are indeed some cases to
which the Bill of Rights does not apply, while there are others where it
applies and imposes binding obligations. Finally, my reading of section
8(3) is that when courts do find the Bill of Rights applicable, they may
develop the common law (or interpret statutes) in the spirit of the
constitution without determining the exact requirements of the consti-
tution as such, but they also may - and sometimes should - render
judgments that explicitly articulate constitutional rules.8 5
The upshot of this long discussion is this: in applying the constitu-
tion to private actors, South African courts are, essentially, obliged to
engage in decisionmaking that will risk impairment of policymaking
declare the constitutional rules that underlie the new causes of action, whether those
causes of action themselves are denominated "common law" or "constitutional."
85. There is no way to predict with any certainty how likely the Constitutional
Court will be to make explicit constitutional rulings about the duties of private actors or
instead to develop the common law without definitive constitutional determinations. In
one recent case, however, the Constitutional Court has concluded that the common law
governing administrative action is so infused with constitutional content that many, per-
haps all, breaches of common law rules of administrative action are also unconstitu-
tional. Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa and Another: In Re
Ex Parte President of the Republic of South Africa and Others, 2000 (2) S.A 674, 696-
98 (CC). The court emphasizes that "administrative law, which forms the core of public
law, occupies a special place in ourjurisprudence," id. at 696, but it is worth noting that
a similar ruling in the context of the duties of private actors could constitutionalize
large reaches of the common law. Whatever its impact on the separation of powers
between the courts and Parliament, one important effect of constitutionalizing fields of
the common law may be to cement the authority of the Constitutional Court - whose
jurisdiction is confined to "constitutional matters, and issues connected with decisions
on constitutional matters," s 167(3) (b) - to review the decisions of the lower South
African courts on a wider range of issues. South Africa's post-apartheid constitutions
largely carried over the judicial system of the old order, while creating a new Constitu-
tional Court; the greater the authority of the Constitutional Court, the greater its ability
to insure that the judiciary as a whole is a part of the remaking of the nation. (I am
indebted to lain Currie for his exegesis of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers case, in a
presentation to the South Africa Reading Group, co-sponsored by New York Law School
and the City University of New York School of Law, in May 2001.)
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and of democratic values. 8 6 The obligation should of course be
honored. The constitution itself reflects a democratic choice to consti-
tutionalize and thus 'judicialize" a wide range of rights claims. It also
significantly mitigates the dangers of this choice by relying heavily on
common law adjudication as the vehicle for some of the new rights
jurisprudence. Still, there will be times when courts are called upon to
speak in binding, constitutional terms and there may well be other
times when less weighty expressions ofjudicial preference still dampen
legislative innovation. Recognition of the risks of such actions counsels
in favor of caution.
Before considering whether "state action" doctrine can further
mitigate these problems, we must assay another possible peril.
3. The impact on private ordering
An undue extension of the applicability of the constitution may
also affect the extent of individual liberty. To take an example cur-
rently at issue in the United States, the imposition of nondiscrimina-
tion requirements inevitably limits the freedom of association, or
perhaps more precisely the corollary freedom of non-association.8 7
86. In the United States, the reach of the constitution also affects another central
question of power - the division between national authority and state authority, and
especially the determination of the power of the federal judiciary vis-A-vis the state gov-
ernments. See, e.g., Kevin L. Cole, Federal and State "State Action". The Undercritical Embrace
of a Hpercriticized Doctrine, 24 GA. L. REv. 327, 358-62 (1990); William W. Van Alstyne &
Kenneth L. Karst, State Action, 14 STAN. L. REv. 3, 8, 14-22, 30, 34-36, 41-44, 49-50, 56-57
(1961). (Since Congress has authority to legislate in many spheres of life having noth-
ing to do with state action, this doctrine no longer sharply constrains federal legislative
power, as it did when other bases of federal legislative authority were more circum-
scribed. Louis Michael Seidman, The State Action Paradox, 10 CONST. COMM. 379, 396
(1993). To the extent that we are now entering another period of "federalist" limita-
tions on national legislative authority, however, the state action doctrine may again
meaningfully limit Congress as well as the federal courts.) It seems reasonable to pre-
dict that the constitutionalization of a wider sphere of South African life will similarly
enhance national judicial power as against provincial political authority. It remains to
be seen, however, whether provincial authority will in general provide either effective
governance or meaningful checks on centralized power in South Africa, and so it is not
yet clear how significant a consideration the potential impact on provincial power from
the extension of the constitution's reach to private actors will actually be.
87. See Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (state law barring dis-
crimination on the basis of sexual orientation by Boy Scouts held an unconstitutional
burden on Boy Scouts' freedom of expressive association); California Democratic Party
v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000) (state law opening political party primary elections to




When is a person's choice of dinner guests, or friends, or club mem-
bers, or business associates, to be considered unfair discrimination
under section 9(4) rather than free association under section 18?
South Africa appears to have committed itself to resolving these ques-
tions as conflicts between competing constitutional rights.8 8 But every
additional constitutional right that is applied to private actors will
bring with it a similar set of dilemmas. It seems clear that the drafters
anticipated this problem, since they provided in section 8(3) (b) that
the courts have the authority to "develop rules of the common law to
limit" constitutional rights - but the fact that the problem can be tack-
led does not make it an easy one.
Acute as these problems may be when the rights in question in-
volve issues such as discrimination, free association, free speech or re-
ligious liberty, it might be thought that socioeconomic rights claims
will not present the same difficulties. There is no distinctive, counter-
vailing liberty associated with housing, it might be said, nor with the
provision of health care services or parental care or environmental
conservation or trade union rights. I am inclined to agree that the
most acute conflicts of rights tend to arise in noneconomic spheres,
but to say that there are no distinctive liberties at play in the areas of
socioeconomic rights is clearly wrong. Some physicians may be unwill-
ing to perform abortions; are they therefore breaching section
27(1) (a)'s requirement of access to "health care services, including re-
productive health care"? Some parents may approve of corporal pun-
ishment, while others oppose its use; would either set of parents be
failing to provide their children with "parental care" under section
28 (1) (b), or failing to protect their children from "maltreatment, neg-
lect, abuse or degradation" under section 28(1) (d)?8 9 Would employ-
ers who encouraged workers to participate in joint labor-management
88. Since s 9(4) mandates the adoption of anti-discrimination legislation, it is pos-
sible that these issues will be seen as conflicts between a constitutional right of free
association and a statutory demand for non-discrimination, rather than as the intersec-
tion of competing constitutional rights. But this anti-discrimination legislation will be
measured against the direct prohibition of private discrimination contained in the first
sentence of 9(4). It seems fair to say that the legislation's requirements will rightly be
viewed as effecting constitutional commands, and that cases of this sort will correspond-
ingly be seen as involving, at least, constitutional concerns on both sides.
89. In this context, the "socio-economic" right to "parental care" overlaps with the
somewhat more traditional negative liberty of freedom "from all forms of violence from
either public or private sources," s 12(1) (c). The Constitutional Court recently raised,
and explicitly left open, the question of whether the latter right required the develop-
ment of the common law under s 8(3) "so as further to regulate or even prohibit caning
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discussion groups be undercutting the trade union representing those
workers, and thus violating workers' or unions' rights under section
23? Would unemployed villagers' killing of protected animals for food
breach section 24's environmental guarantees, even if those villagers
had traditionally hunted the animals in question? Would a building
contractor's sale of title to new houses (in furtherance of section
26(1)'s guarantee of access to adequate housing) to the individual
wives in a polygamous marriage undercut the structure of that mar-
riage, in violation of the right to traditional marriage and family law
protected by section 15 (3)?
My point here is not that there are inalienable liberties at stake in
each of these contexts that should be beyond all governmental power.
Some or many of the choices suggested by the questions in the previ-
ous paragraph might rightly be put off limits, either by legislatures or
by courts. Moreover, if private acts that injure others are not forbid-
den, then those who are injured by them will suffer a blow to their
rights and freedoms. 90
Nevertheless, the constitutionalizing of a wide range of interac-
tions between citizens does present potential threats to private order-
ing. At the very least, the interference with legislative and political
decisionmaking, discussed above as a separation of powers issue, will
have an impact on how conflicting claims of human liberty are re-
solved. Presumably courts will be readier than legislatures to impinge
on majority wishes for the sake of minority claims. Presumably courts
will also be more inclined than legislatures to make decisions that pre-
cisely reflect logic and principle, rather than compromise and prag-
matic adjustment. Presumably courts will feel more obliged to resolve
claims brought before them, rather than - as legislatures might - to
postpone definitive action of any kind in favor of studies or simply si-
lence. And perhaps courts will be more inclined to move in these di-
rections on the strength of constitutional mandates or principles than
they would be if their duty was only to resolve the same cases in light of
general principles of the common law. Thoroughgoing judicial appli-
cation of the constitution to private actors in this fashion will surely
produce some benefits, but it may also exact real costs.
[a form of corporal punishment] in the home." Christian Education South Africa v.
Minister of Education, 2000 (4) S.A. 757, 785 48 (CC).
90. Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 503, 536-37
(1985); Woolman, supra note 6, at 10-48.
[Vol. 45
A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLUENCE
There are other conceivable dangers to liberty as well. The
choices courts will have to make between private actors' conflicting
claims of right may be difficult ones for several reasons. As an initial
matter, the weighing of such claims in constitutional terms is still, in
South Africa and probably many other constitutional states, a relatively
unfamiliar judicial enterprise. In addition, each party to the dispute,
after all, may have a real - that is, a somewhat compelling - constitu-
tional interest at stake.91 Moreover, the constitution itself, as already
noted, by no means specifies how to rank all the conflicting claims. It is
quite possible that courts called upon to resolve conflicting claims of
private constitutional rights may be less vigilant in defense of some of
these rights than they would be if they encountered them only in con-
tests between individuals and the state.92
Another possible result is that courts will feel a momentum for
consistency in articulating the corresponding duties of public and pri-
vate actors. If state social workers are forbidden to use corporal punish-
ment, so may parents be; if state hospitals are required to provide
abortions, so might all obstetricians, or at least all obstetricians who are
the sole providers in their towns; if the state must protect endangered
species, so must each village's people. Ironically, the momentum for
consistency might also have the opposite effect: if private actors, sub-
ject to constitutional duties, are permitted to engage in a given form of
conduct, then perhaps the state will be granted similar leeway.93
Overuse of the Bill of Rights might also have troubling, broader
implications for rights protection. The American scholar William Mar-
shall has suggested that "[c]haracterizing every shouting match or
every decision with whom to associate as actions that may lead to con-
stitutional liability is to 'trivialize' the meaning of constitutional protec-
tion and thereby to weaken the force of a claim of 'true' constitutional
91. See William P. Marshall, Diluting Constitutional Rights: Rethinking Rethinking
State Action', 80 Nw. U. L. Ray. 558, 561-62 (1985). In conflicts between the state and a
private actor, by contrast, the state presumably will not ordinarily be able to invoke
constitutional rights on its side of the balance, though it may well be able to assert
important governmental interests recognized by the constitution. For the possibility
that the state may have "rights" under South Africa's constitution, however, see Cock-
rell, supra note 48, at 3A-13 n.3.
92. Peter Quint reports that Germany's "indirect application" of constitutional val-
ues has resulted in claims of free speech sometimes being denied when they clash with
claims of injury to constitutionally-protected human dignity. Quint, supra note 51, at
290-302, 314-18, 344-45.
93. Marshall, supra note 91, at 562.
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violation by overexposure. ' 94 He worries too that if the Constitution
comes to be seen by many people as a constraint on them rather than a
protection, then it may lose its claim on popular adherence as "the
protector of liberty."95
These concerns deserve consideration, because we simply do not
know yet what the effect of a full-scale application of the Bill of Rights
to private actors will be. As with the separation of powers problems
discussed above, however, I do not suggest that the rights protection
issues laid out here call for courts to reject the invitation for horizontal
application in section 8(2). If constitutional rights can be overused,
then they should be used less. If they can be applied too rigidly, then
they should be applied in more supple fashion. But when constitu-
tional rulings are needed and wise, they should be made. These guide-
lines are of course much easier to state than to apply, but section
8(3) 's authorization - as I have read it - of both constitutional decla-
rations and common law decisionmaking provides the vehicle for mak-
ing the necessary discriminations. Where firm rights protection is
called for, constitutional declarations should be made; where greater
caution or case-by-case reflection is needed, courts can engage in com-
mon law decisionmaking that reflects constitutional values but does
not impose constitutional edicts. What we need to consider now is how
the courts are to determine when section 8(2)'s invitation should be
accepted.
C. "The nature of the right and the nature of any duty imposed by
the right"
Let us consider the case of pharmaceutical companies that manu-
facture drugs used for the treatment of AIDS. The provision of these
drugs to patients by the government is unquestionably a part of mak-
ing health care services available to everyone, as section 27(1) (a) man-
dates, and so it seems reasonable to say that the companies producing
the drugs are in this respect participating in, or at least decisively af-
fecting, the performance of a public function.96 No doubt they do so
under a variety of regulatory provisions embodied in or derived from
legislation, and with the aid of patent rights secured by domestic and
international law. Nevertheless, the import of the discussion of section
94. Id. at 569.
95. Id. at 569-70.




239 earlier in this article is that these various links to the state probably
do not by themselves transform the drug companies' production of
anti-AIDS drugs into a public function conducted in terms of this legis-
lation. (I do not mean to say that these links to the state are irrelevant,
however; we will return to their significance below.) We therefore now
face the question posed by section 8(2), of whether the right to access
to health care should bind the pharmaceutical companies, "taking into
account the nature of the right and the nature of any duty imposed by
the right."
It is appropriate to begin with the most direct meanings of this
language. In certain respects the nature of the duties imposed by the
various provisions of the Bill of Rights makes it quite clear that some
do, and some do not, apply to private actors. Section 27(2), for exam-
ple, calls on "[t] he state" to "take reasonable legislative and other mea-
sures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive
realisation of each of these rights." Only the state, whose boundaries
we have examined in connection with section 239, is charged with tak-
ing these steps.9 7 On the other hand, section 27(3), which provides
that "[n]o one may be refused emergency medical treatment," seems
readily applicable to each and every physician, whether publicly or pri-
vately employed, who is available to provide emergency medical treat-
ment and refuses to do so.98
The pharmaceutical companies' pricing of their drugs, however,
does not seem to raise issues under either section 27(2) or section
27(3). The companies are not part of the state, as section 27(2) would
require; and AIDS medications, vital as they are, in general are treat-
ments of a chronic condition and hence not, under the Soobramoney
decision, emergency medical treatment.9 9 If, then, any claim against
97. Section 26(2) is equally clearly focused on the state's role in providing access
to housing. Section 29(1)(b) also focuses on the state's duty, although the right to
further education beyond the "basic" level is not specifically stated to bind only the
state. Section 24(b)'s focus is somewhat less clear, this provision entitles everyone to the
right "to have the environment protected... through reasonable legislative and other
measures," and "other" measures in principle could be taken by actors besides
governments.
98. As we have already seen, a number of Bill of Rights provisions are directed to
private actors or at the least oblige the state to regulate private actors' behavior. See
notes 45 & 46 supra.
99. Soobramoney v. Minister of Health, KivaZulu-Natal, 1998 (1) S.A. 765, 772-75
11 18-24 (CC). The provision of anti-AIDS medication to pregnant HIV-positive
mothers in order to prevent the infection of their children, however, might well consti-
tute an emergency matter. Sadly, however, it is possible that babies protected this way
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the companies would have to rest on section 27(1)'s right of access to
health care, we need to ask, first, whether that right has any enforcea-
ble content at all, and, second, whether - if it is enforceable at all -
it is enforceable against private, non-governmental actors. 100
It might be argued that the right to access to health care imposes
no enforceable duties at all, but amounts only to an aspiration whose
concrete realization depends on the largely discretionary decisions of
legislatures as they seek, pursuant to section 27(2), "to achieve the pro-
gressive realisation of... these rights." This seems mistaken, however.
Even if it is very difficult for courts to regulate the long process of
expanding access to expensive rights in a largely poor country, it seems
somewhat easier for courts to identify denials of access and to say, for
example, that section 27(1) imposes a duty not to deny such access. 10 1
will still succumb to infection from breastfeeding. Lawrence K. Altman, AIDS Studies on
Infants Appear to Conflict, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2000 at A8. Even so, such treatment might
be seen as an emergency matter, since this intervention may be necessary, even if not
sufficient, to permanently forestall a chronic, fatal disease. The government's pilot
nevirapine program now reaches "only about 90,000 women a year, about 10 percent of
those who give birth annually in South Africa," and an AIDS activist group, the Treat-
ment Action Campaign, has filed suit against the government to press for wider availa-
bility of the drug. Rachel L. Swarns, A Move to Force South Africa to Give AIDS Drug for
Newborns, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2001, at A8.
100. Section 27 also guarantees "the right to have access" to food, water and social
security. Similarly, section 26 guarantees "the right to have access to adequate housing."
Certain other broad socioeconomic rights are more firmly phrased, without the possibly
limiting word "access": the right to a basic education (29(1)); children's rights, in par-
ticular to "basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and social services"
(28(1) (c)); and the right "to an environment that is not harmful to... health or well-
being" (24(a)).
101. Pierre de Vos reaches this conclusion on the ground that the state's obliga-
tion under section 7(2) to "respect" all rights in the Bill of Rights "guarantees every
person the right not to have her or his access to housing, health care, sufficient food
and water, social security and the right to basic education subjected to unjustified inter-
ference." Pierre de Vos, Pious Wishes or Directly Enforceable Human Rights?: Social and Eco-
nomic Rights in South Africa's 1996 Constitution, 13 So. AFR. J. HUM. RTs. 67, 80 (1997).
Sandra Liebenberg also emphasizes the state's duty to respect, and therefore not to
deny access to, rights in her essay, Identfying Violations of Socio-Economic Rights Under the
South African Constitution - The Role of the South African Human Rights Commission, in THE
POST-APARTHEID CONSTITUTIONS: PERSPECTIVES ON SOUTH AFRICA'S BASIc LAw 405, 411-
12 (Penelope Andrews & Stephen Ellmann eds. 2001). Frank Michelman has also urged
that an infringement on the right of access can be something "other than a failure...
to take 'measures to achieve realisation' of the 'access' in question for 'everyone.'"
Frank Michelman, The Constitution, Social Rights and Reason: A Tribute to Etienne Mureinik,
14 So. AR. J. HUM. RTS. 499, 504 (1998).
More authoritatively than any of these, the Constitutional Court has recently de-
clared, in a case dealing with the right of access to housing under s 26, that "[a] lthough
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To be sure, even defining denials of access is not simple, since every
failure to treat is a denial of a sort, yet no provider can treat everyone,
or provide unlimited services without somehow- receiving revenue in
return.
But this problem is not altogether intractable. We might define
one form of unconstitutional denial of access as action that prevents
the provision of health services and that does not rest on an acceptable
justification in terms of the actor's other rights and responsibilities.
Arbitrary cut-offs of social security payments to some recipients, in or-
der to keep total expenditures within allocated limits, might well be a
denial of access to social security under this standard.10 2 And it is par-
ticularly easy to see that poor South Africans are currently being de-
the subsection [26(1): "Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing."]
does not expressly say so, there is, at the very least, a negative obligation placed upon
the state and all other entities and persons to desist from preventing or impairing the
right of access to adequate housing." Government of the Republic of South Africa and
Others v. Grootboom and Others, 2001 (1) S.A. 46, 66 34 (CC). The Court here
endorses not only the existence of a protection against denial of this right, but also the
application of this protection to private actors, although the reference to private actors
is dictum.
The Grootboom Court went on to examine the positive obligations of the state. In
elaborating the meaning of section 26(2)'s requirement that the state "take reasonable
legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive
realisation of this right," the Court declared that "[t]hose whose needs are the most
urgent and whose ability to enjoy all rights therefore is most in peril, must not be ig-
nored by the measures aimed at achieving realisation of the right." Id. at 69 44. Be-
cause the state's housing programs, albeit a "major achievement," id. at 76 53, had left
'out of account the immediate amelioration of the circumstances of those in crisis," id.
at 78 64, so that "people in desperate need are left without any form of assistance with
no end in sight," id. at 79 65, the Court concluded that these programs violated s
26(2). Id. at 79-80 69. This is a major step forward in the jurisprudence of socio-
economic rights. Because the duty to "take reasonable legislative and other measures"
explicitly applies to the state, however, it remains important to consider the dimensions
of the distinct duty, potentially applicable to private as well as public actors, not to
"deny" this right.
102. See iebenberg, supra note 101, at 411. Similarly, a decision to use water from
a private reservoir for cattle instead of for essential human uses during a drought would
be a denial of access to water, in violation of section 27(1) (b). (Michelman asks
whether a "common-law controversy over whether a particular water source is to be
tapped for industrial use or rather left for domestic consumption by those who lack a
good alternative supply of water" might be a case for the application of socioeconomic
rights to private actors. Michelman, supra note 101, at 504.) So, too, a general hospi-
ta's decision not to provide inoculations against childhood diseases, while continuing
to offer elective plastic surgery, might well be a denial of access to health care. In each
of these cases, the actor's needs would not be sufficient to justify the kind of deprivation
imposed.
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nied meaningful access to anti-AIDS medication because they cannot
pay the prices that the manufacturers charge. Judge Edwin Cameron
recently spelled this out, when he attacked "the iniquity of drug availa-
bility and access in Africa" at the Durban AIDS conference in July,
2000, and declared that "[a] midst the poverty of Africa, I stand before
you because I am able to purchase health and vigour. I am here be-
cause I can afford to pay for life itself."10 3 Although drug prices have
been reduced since then, 10 4 the vast majority of South Africans in-
fected with HIV still are unable to afford AIDS medications. 10 5
Unless this denial can be justified in terms of the pharmaceutical
companies' legitimate interests, it is unconstitutional - assuming that
the pharmaceutical companies are bound by section 27(1) in the first
place. Whether the companies' plausible interests in earning reasona-
ble returns on their medical research justify the prices they had been
charging until earlier this year - or the much lower prices they are
now offering in poor countries10 6 - is a question that ultimately might
have to be litigated to be settled. Whether a court could fashion an
order sensibly determining the extent of the price reductions that
might be required would also be a difficult issue. 10 7 If, however, it
proves feasible for the companies to further significantly reduce their
prices, without compromising their financial stability, then refusing to
make such reductions would be unconstitutional.10 8
103. Judge Cameron is quoted in Andre Picard, Denial of AIDS drugs to poor called
immoral; Treatment must become cheaper, more available, conference told, THE GLOBE AND MAIL
(July 11, 2000) (available on LEXIS).
104. See note 115 infra.
105. See Rachel L. Swarns, Despite Legal Victory, South Africa Hesitates on AIDS Drugs,
N.Y. TIMEs, April 21, 2001, at A4; Rachel L. Swarns, AIDS Obstacles Overwhelm a Small
South African Town, N.Y. TIMES, March 29, 2001 at Al.
106. See note 115 infra.
107. It must be acknowledged that determining the proper remedy in such a case
would not be easy. Courts might need to decide how much drug prices would have to
be reduced, and how to take into account such factors as patient need, company fi-
nances, and the various price reductions and donations of free medication that the
companies are already engaging in. Difficult as this might be, however, I would not
presume it is impossible, and courts might utilize for this purpose the remedy-framing
processes discussed earlier in this essay. See text at notes 65-66 supra.
108. If the impact of the price reductions necessary to make AIDS drugs available
to the citizens of poor countries - as much as 95 % reductions, according to a recent
study by the Panos Institute, Picard, supra note 103 - would compromise the companies'
financial stability, then under my analysis the companies' refusal to reduce their prices
would not be an unconstitutional denial of access. In that case what Judge Cameron
calls the "moral emergency" posed by this issue, id., would have to be met by govern-
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But are the drug companies bound by the access provision in the
first place?10 9 In light of the Constitutional Court's decision in Groot-
boom,110 it now seems clear that section 27(2) - which directs the state
to take reasonable legislative and other measures to achieve each of
the access rights in section 27(1), including the right to access to
health care services - does not preclude application of 27(1)'s re-
quirements to private actors."' Section 27(2) tells us part of what the
state must do to implement these rights; it does not tell us that only the
state need do anything. If there is no textual bar, then let us turn to
the other portion of the inquiry specified by 8(2) itself, the examina-
tion of "the nature of the right" - that is, the AIDS victims' right - at
stake.
The more compelling the right, presumably, the more reasonable
it is that the right should be found applicable to private actors. Just as
South Africa has explicitly made private discrimination a breach of the
ments rather than private companies, and the legal duties of those governments, if any,
would be measured by international law as well as by each nation's constitution.
If reductions in AIDS drug pricing would not by themselves jeopardize the compa-
nies' financial bottom lines, but similar reductions for other drugs needed by poor
sufferers in the Third World or elsewhere would have this effect, then a constitutional
duty to reduce AIDS drug prices could only be founded on the argument that the AIDS
emergency is qualitatively different from the immense human suffering caused by other
diseases that could be prevented or treated but only at unaffordable expense. This argu-
ment might be correct, but it is called into question by the shameful numbers of deaths
that still result from other preventable diseases. According to the World Health Organi-
zation, for example, "[a]bout one million children die from measles each year." World
Health Organization, Vaccine Research & Development (VAD): Measles, Acute Respira-
tory Virus (ARV) and Poliomyelitis vaccines, www.who.int/vaccines-diseases/research/
virusl.htm (visited July 26, 2000) (emphasis in original).
It would also be doubtful that high drug prices amounted to a denial of access, if
reductions in drug prices would not meaningfully contribute to alleviating the AIDS
crisis because of other weaknesses in poor countries' health care systems. Cf note 99
supra. There are such weaknesses, but it seems to be widely agreed that drug price
reductions are still an essential and meaningful step. See Belinda Beresford, Drugs et the
rich buy a few more years of life, DAILY MAIL & GUARDIAN, July 14, 2000 (available at
www.mg.co.za/mg/news/2000julyl/14jul-aids2.html).
109. If private companies do not have a duty to lower prices under section 27(1), it
may be that no one has this duty. The government of course could purchase drugs and
then distribute them free or at lower cost, but this is precisely the sort of disposition of
the government's "available resources" that section 27(2) appears to leave largely -
though not entirely, see note 101 supra - in the discretion of the government.
110. Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v. Grootboom and
Others, 2001 (1) S.A. 46 (CC).
111. See note 101 supra.
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constitution,112 no doubt out of a recognition of the outrageousness of
this form of injustice and its centrality in South African history, so it is
reasonable to see section 8(2) as aimed, in part, at barring private ac-
tors from other, comparably egregious breaches of human rights. For
similar reasons, perhaps, the Thirteenth Amendment of the United
States constitution bans slavery, and is "not a mere prohibition of state
laws establishing or upholding slavery, but an absolute declaration that
slavery or involuntary servitude shall not exist in any part of the United
States."1 13 And while United States constitutional law does not explic-
itly treat the "state action" inquiry differently depending on what right
has been violated by the supposedly private actor, it seems possible that
US law too is specially reluctant to find race discrimination so private
as to be immune from constitutional challenge. 1 4 Here, the unavaila-
112. S9(5).
113. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 20.
114. See Chemerinsky, supra note 90, at 540. Perhaps the most prominent example
of this special reluctance to immunize private racial discrimination is Shelley v. Krae-
mer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). See also Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 645
(1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (attacking what he viewed as the Court's "overhaul" of
state action law in finding state action in private litigants' race-based peremptory chal-
lenges to potential jurors).
Historically, it seems fair to say that much of the pressure to abandon state action
limitations, from scholars and probably from litigators as well, came from the recogni-
tion that those limits operated to immunize putatively private racial discrimination that
was often society-wide and covertly engineered by states. See, e.g., Charles L. Black, Jr.,
The Supreme Court-1966 Term: Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protection, and California s
Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REv. 69, 70 (1967) (addressing "the 'state action' doctrine
and its arrested metamorphoses only as touching the field of racial discrimination");
David A. Strauss, State Action After the Civil Rights Era, 10 CONST. CoNum. 409, 409-14
(1993); Maimon Schwarzschild, Value Pluralism and the Constitution: In Defense of the State
Action Doctrine, 1988 Sup. CT. REv. 129, 155-56. Two scholars have suggested that the
Court largely solved the state action problem in the area of race by broadly reading a
federal statute barring many forms of private race discrimination - thereby removing
the need for litigants to frame constitutional claims. RobertJ. Glennon, Jr. & John E.
Nowak, A Functional Analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment "State Action" Requirement, 1976
Sup. CT. REV. 221, 222-23.
In the civil rights era and the years that followed, academic criticism of state action
doctrine was intense. Mark Tushnet wrote in 1988 that "[a]cademic commentators
[were] almost unanimous" in believing that the state action doctrine should be re-
placed with a substantive balancing of the constitutional interests in question. Mark
Tushnet, Shelley v. Kraemer and Theories of Equality, 33 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 383, 391
(1988). As Tushnet pointed out, however, it was striking that the Court had tenaciously
adhered to this body of law. A number of scholars in recent years have also found some
merit in this doctrine. See Cole, supra note 88; Richard S. Kay, The State Action Doctrine,
The Public-Private Distinction, and the Independence of Constitutional Law, 10 CONST. COMM.
329 (1993); Krotoszynski, supra note 7; Schwarzschild, supra; Barbara Rook Snyder, Pri-
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bility of AIDS drugs means likely death, from a disease that could be
forestalled for years or even (for newborns) perhaps prevented alto-
gether, of a large fraction of the South African population. This is an
outrageous result, and strongly supports applying the right of access to
private actors.
D. Suggestions from the law of "state action"
Though the application of section 27(1) to the pharmaceutical
companies is hardly free from doubt, the sheer horror of the AIDS
crisis generates so strong a claim of right that this alone produces a
powerful momentum for applying section 27(1) to the claims of AIDS
sufferers against the companies' pricing policies. But this analysis
under 8(2) does not take us quite as far as might be supposed. What if
the target of the litigation were not a pharmaceutical company but a
pharmacist - and not the owner of a nationwide chain of drug stores
but a sole proprietor in a small community? Or a private medical clinic
with a supply of AIDS medications? The pharmacist and the clinic, like
the multinational drug companies, hold life and death on their
shelves. Within some limits, presumably both the pharmacist and the
clinic, like the drug manufacturers, could reduce the prices they
charge to patients without financial disaster. But the case for applying
section 27(1) to these actors seems less compelling than the case for
reaching the pharmaceutical companies, even though the nature of
the right and the nature of the duty at stake seem quite similar.
One way to describe the difference between these actors and the
pharmaceutical companies is simply to say that these smaller entities
bear less resemblance to the state. The pharmaceutical companies are,
vate Motivation, State Action and the Allocation of Responsibility for Tourteenth Amendment Vio-
lations, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 1053 (1990).
It seems quite appropriate that the gradual growth of other legal remedies for
racial discrimination - imperfect as they are - has diminished the pressure for aban-
donment of the state action doctrine, and encouraged scholars to revisit its possible
virtues. (Ironically, as Schwarzschild notes, with the Supreme Court's increasing hostil-
ity to government affirmative action in the field of race, the state action doctrine now
may operate to shield private actors engaged in similar programs from the strict scru-
tiny that would be applied to them if they were viewed as part of the state. Schwarz-
schild, supra, at 159-60.)
In South Africa, however, the wounds of apartheid are still very fresh, perhaps most
of all in the massive heritage of poverty and disadvantage left behind by the old system,
and the assault of AIDS compounds them. These still acute problems provide a strong
reason for courts to take up the constitution's invitation to scrutinize the behavior of
private actors.
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first of all, much richer and more powerful; indeed, the companies
operate on a level of international economic and political power that
has allowed them, until recently, to threaten governments.1 1 5 As a re-
sult, they have a power to oppress that resembles the power of states.
The individual pharmacist or even the private clinic, in contrast, do
not seem to wield as frightening a level of power. Influential as either
entity might be at a local level, they presumably have little ability to
coerce entire nations. Certainly they have less authority over drug
prices in particular, since they themselves must purchase the drugs
from the pharmaceutical companies. Moreover, there are probably
often other pharmacies, and other clinics, to which AIDS sufferers
could try to turn; while these other actors might also be disinclined to
give away medications, none of them individually would wield quite the
level of market power that the pharmaceutical companies enjoy.
115. According to one report:
The South African pharmaceutical industry, which included subsidiar-
ies of American and European companies, took the pressure much further.
It closed factories, canceled investments and took out scare ads suggesting
that babies could be hurt by counterfeit generic drugs. Its chief lobbyist,
Mirryena Deeb, threatened to cut off all new drug discoveries to South Af-
rica if the new law [permitting circumvention of patent restrictions] passed,
including AIDS drugs, cancer drugs and antibiotics. Asked in a March 1998
interview if she was literally threatening to let thousands of South Africans
die, she reluctantly conceded: 'In so many words, yes.'
Donald G. McNeil, Jr., As Devastating Epidemics Increase, Nations Take on Drug Companies,
N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2000, at 8.
Ultimately, the pharmaceutical industry chose to bring suit in South Africa to chal-
lenge the country's provisions for potential restriction of patent rights, contained in the
Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act 90 of 1997. This step
proved to be a tremendous mistake. The case became a "public relations diaster,"
spawning "demonstrations around the world," and generating support - for South Af-
rica's right to adopt the law - from the United States, the European Union and the
World Trade Organisation. Chris McGreal & Sarah Bosely, Drug Giants Told to Reveal
Secrets, THE GUARDIAN, Mar. 7, 2001 (available on LEXIS). The industry ultimately chose
to withdraw the case, in an agreement facilitated by United Nations Secretary General
Kofi Annan, while several manufacturers "slashed the prices of their AIDS medicines to
levels unimaginable even two months earlier." Rachel L. Swarns, Drug Makers Drop South
Africa Suit Over AIDS Medicine, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2001, at Al.
The settlement "was expected to embolden other developing countries that have
also been calling for cheaper drugs to deal with the spreading AIDS epidemic." Id. A
recent World Trade Organization declaration may provide further support. See Melody
Petersen, U.S. Companies Largely Back Trade Decisions; Agreement on Medicines, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 15, 2001, at C3. While it is heartening to see that such arrogant power can be
defeated, it remains true that private actors such as the pharmaceutical industry can
wield tremendous power. (For a report of a recent debate over whether patents are
actually the cause of poor Africans' inability to purchase AIDS drugs, however, see Don-
ald G. McNeil, Patents or Poverty? New Debate Over Lack of AIDS Care in Africa, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 5, 2001, at A6.)
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While the crux of the difference between the multinationals and
the local medical facilities is power, it is not surprising to find that this
difference in power corresponds to, and grows partly out of, differ-
ences in relations between these private actors and the state. All of
these actors, to be sure, have links to the state. The state provides, or
tries to provide, the law enforcement and other basic services that en-
able all of them to operate. It probably regulates all of them. It may
well license all of them to do business. Those licenses, in turn, give
pharmacists and medical practitioners some measure of market power,
at least along with other members of their professions.1 1 6 But the state
also gives to the pharmaceutical companies a particular set of rights
which none of the other actors in this scenario possesses, legal claims
that are a central source of the companies' power: the rights of patent,
which enable the companies to block competing production for sub-
stantial periods and thus potentially to reap monopoly profits on their
drugs. These rights are secured by national and international legal pro-
visions, buttressed, no doubt, by diplomatic pressure and the compa-
nies' domestic political influence. In sum, the phannaceutical
companies wield great power, power linked significantly to the state -
and with this power they constrain the state's performance of its duty
to provide access to health.
Without this assessment of the companies' role, the analysis of the
nature of the right and of the corresponding duty which the preceding
section set out is incomplete. American scholars have repeatedly at-
tacked American state action doctrine because it does not explicitly
and frankly consider the nature of the underlying rights at stake, and
instead looks only to the private or non-private status of the actors in-
volved." 7 Section 8(2) avoids that pitfall - but if this section is read to
116. Even though individual pharmacists or physicians have not been granted mo-
nopoly power by the state, it may be argued that the members of licensed professions,
collectively, are monopolists and therefore rightly subject to constitutional regulation. I
am not sure, however, what a collective constitutional duty would mean for each indi-
vidual member of the profession, and I am hesitant about treating the not-terribly-pow-
erful individual members of professions as collectively subject to constitutional duties
that they would not individually incur.
117. See Paul Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A Casenote on Flagg Brothers v.
Brooks, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1296, 1330 (1982) (arguing that "the Court's state action
doctrine seems a crude substitute for addressing and accommodating the concerns to
prevent abuse of power on the one hand, and to protect individual autonomy and fed-
eralist values on the other"); Chemerinsky, supra note 90, at 537-42; Glennon & Nowak,
supra note 114, at 228-32 (arguing that the Supreme Court has actually, though not
explicitly, weighed claims of rights in its state action decisions); Louis Henkin, Shelleyv.
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exclude any attention to the status of the actor, then it has escaped one
pitfall only to encounter another.
As we have already seen, however, sections 8(2) and 239 between
them confirm the continuing relevance of the distinction between
state and private actors. Section 239 specifically focuses on certain
forms of state-connectedness in determining which seemingly private
entities should be classified as organs of state. Section 8(2) also permits
exploration of the actor's status. "IT]he nature of the right and the
nature of any duty imposed by the right" are concepts broad enough to
encompass attention to the status of the actors as well as their actions,
if the status of the actor actually makes any difference to the proper
extent of his or her constitutional duties - and surely it does. To im-
pose a burdensome duty is, after all, more appropriate if the duty-
holder is able to bear that duty, or if the duty-holder has taken actions
which make it morally fair to impose that duty in response. On either
score, the status of the actor, measured in terms of such factors as
power, position in society, and past conduct, may be very relevant to
the constitutional calculus. Imposing a duty may also be less appropri-
ate if, for example, the potential duty-holder has strong countervailing
claims that justify his or her acting in a way that would not comport
with that duty, and the status of the actor may be relevant on this score
as well. An individual may be entitled to discriminate in certain inti-
mate contexts, for example, whereas an entity linked to the state may
be seen as having no such private liberties.
American "state action" law provides helpful indications of the na-
ture of these factors bearing on the status of the actor that deserve
consideration. Although the power of the actor is not, as such, a dis-
positive factor in this field of law - an omission that South Africa
should correct"" - broadly the cases direct our attention to those
Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 473, 491-96 (1962) (arguing that
state enforcement of private discrimination is, as Shelley held, unconstitutional, unless a
balancing of the conflicting rights to discriminate and to be free of discrimination in a
particular context leads to the conclusion that the state can, in that context, favor the
right to discriminate). Professor Tribe has similarly commented that, because the Court
lacks "a unified, affirmative theory of liberty," its "recent state action decisions, insofar
as they purport to articulate and apply an autonomous state action doctrine, appear
peculiarly unpersuasive." TRIBE, supra note 5, at 1697.
118. Admittedly, power may be hard to measure, as Schwarzschild emphasizes,
Schwarzschild, supra note 114, at 138, and surely varies from context to context, as
Wellington points out, Wellington, supra note 3, at 347 n.14 (quoting Manning, Corpo-
rate Power and Individual Freedom: Some General Analysis and Particular Reservations, 55 Nw.
U.L. REv. 38, 44-45 (1960)). I do not believe that power is so difficult to appraise, how-
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factors that "in all fairness" make the action of a private party attributa-
ble to the state.119 These factors include whether the private actor is
performing a public function; whether the state has compelled or en-
couraged the action in question; and whether the state is intertwined
with the private actor. These factors can all help to highlight private
actors who are exercising overweening power - and also to identify less
dominant actors whose authority nevertheless has special links to the
state.
We have already explored the "public function" inquiry. In consid-
ering this issue in the context of section 239, however, we focused a
good deal of attention on the distinct question of whether the entity
performing the public function did so "in terms of" constitutional or
legislative provisions. I urged a somewhat constrained interpretation of
"in terms of," precisely in order to avoid an almost infinite potential
expansion of the reach of section 239.120 In the context of section
8(2), however, South African courts do not face the stark choice (is an
entity an organ of state, or is it not?) posed by section 239. Instead,
they can take public function considerations into account, along with
others - notably including a direct analysis of the rights and duties at
stake - to resolve the application question wisely. In this context, it
might well make a difference that a private actor is performing a pub-
lic function, even if that action is utterly without any sanction in the
law.
Suppose, for example, that a vigilante group undertakes not only
to apprehend criminals, but also to try them and inflict corporal pun-
ishment on those found guilty. All of this would amount to a usurpa-
tion, perhaps a completely arbitrary and lawless usurpation, of the state
function of enforcing the criminal law. Why make these actions, and
not an equally lengthy series of criminal assaults carried out simply for
personal gain, a constitutional matter? One good reason would be be-
cause without a state monopoly on the institutions of law enforcement
the society faces dangers even worse than those of widespread crime,
dangers on the lines of the creation of dictatorial fiefdoms. In short,
the status of the actor - or, more precisely, the status of the role that
the actor has assumed - bears on the rights and duties that the consti-
tution should be found to protect.
ever, that its assessment cannot be one of the factors employed in deciding when to
apply constitutional duties to private actors.
119. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 500 U.S. at 621.
120. See text at notes 29-33 supra.
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The question of whether the state has compelled or encouraged
the private action requires consideration of a range of interactions be-
tween public and private parties. The clearest cases, certainly, would be
instances where the state forces private actors to engage in some action
that would be unconstitutional for the state to undertake. The well-
known case of Shelley v. Kraemer illustrates this situation. 12 1 There the
plaintiffs sued to enforce a racial covenant barring sales of houses to
African-Americans; the white seller and African-American buyer were
willing to complete the transaction but the courts, if they enforced the
covenant, would force discrimination to take place. It is important,
however, not to think that every instance of state coercive power
amounts to state action. Suppose, for example, that a church wishes to
exclude non-believers from a ceremony. Ultimately, such exclusions
can only be enforced through private pressure or violence or by calling
the police; if the police are called and arrest the unwelcome attenders
for trespass, then state coercive power has been employed. In this set-
ting, however, the state has not compelled anyone to discriminate, and
it would be unlikely that the availability of the police would make the
church's exclusionary action into "state action."'122
It could certainly be said, however, that the government's willing-
ness to send the police to the church encourages the church to main-
tain its policy of exclusion. So does its continued provision of services
such as sewage, trash collection and firefighting. In a sense, every ac-
tion that the government does not forbid it encourages, at least as
compared to the actions it does prohibit. If the division between state
and private action means anything, it must mean that some encourage-
ment greater than this is required to link the private actor to the state
so as to justify, on this ground, the application of constitutional limits
to the private actor. 123 Current case law insists that "[m] ere approval of
or acquiescence" by government in private initiatives is not suffi-
cient.124 Specific governmental authorization of a particular private
practice might provide the necessary additional link, though American
case law on this point is quite mixed. 125 Funding the activity in ques-
121. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
122. The U.S. Supreme Court avoided deciding the question of whether purely
private racial exclusions could be enforced by the state without constituting state action.
See Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964); Glennon & Nowak, supra note 114, at 240.
123. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. at 173.
124. Blum v. Yaretzky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982).
125. Compare Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 376 (1967) (private real estate dis-
crimination held to be state action because a California state constitutional amendment
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don might also provide this encouragement, but current cases make
clear that funding by itself is by no means enough.
126
Finally, government and private actors may be so closely linked to
each other that supposedly private actions are fairly treated as public.
Some of the circumstances already mentioned matter in this regard as
well: for example, financial dependence is a form of linkage, and mu-
tual financial dependence or a "symbiotic relationship" may be espe-
cially important.' 27 The fact that the private activity takes place on state
barring legislative prohibition of such discrimination in effect "constitutionalized the
private right to discriminate," even though the state might well have been free simply to
repeal its existing anti-discrimination statutes); Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak,
343 U.S. 452, 462-63 (1952) (finding it necessary to consider the First and Fifth Amend-
ments' application to a bus company's piping in radio on its buses "particularly" be-
cause the Public Utilities Commission "pursuant to protests against the radio program,
ordered an investigation of it and, after formal public hearings, ordered.its investiga-
tion dismissed on the ground that the public safety, comfort and convenience were not
impaired thereby"); McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 235 U.S. 151, 161-
62 (1914) ("It is the individual who is entitled to the equal protection of the laws, and if
he is denied by a common carrier, acting in the matter under the authority of a state
law, a facility or convenience in the course of his journey which under substantially the
same circumstances is furnished to another traveler, he may properly complain that his
constitutional privilege has been invaded"); with Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S.
149, 165 (1978) (state statute authorizing warehouseman to sell goods placed with him
to cover unpaid charges held not to be "sufficient encouragement to make the State
responsible" for the sale); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 354, 357
(1974) (Public Utility Commission's approval of a "general tariff' including a provision
stating the company's "right to terminate service for nonpayment" does not make such
termination state action; "[a]pproval by a state utility commission of such a request
from a regulated utility, where the commission has not put its own weight on the side of
the proposed practice by ordering it, does not transmute a practice initiated by the
utility and approved by the commission into 'state action'").
126. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840 (1982) (finding that personnel
decisions by a private school that was funded almost entirely by the state were not state
action). Cf. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350-52 (1974) (state's
conferral of monopoly position on a private utility company held "not determinative" of
whether its cut-off of service to a customer was state action, although "[i ] t may well be
that acts of a heavily regulated utility with at least something of a governmentally pro-
tected monopoly will more readily be found to be 'state' acts than will the acts of an
entity lacking these characteristics").
127. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (city-owned
parking facility leased space to a restaurant which discriminated on the basis of race).
The Supreme Court has rarely followed Burton in other cases. But in a recent decision,
Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Assn, 121 S.Ct. 924
(2001), the Court found that a "not-for-profit membership corporation," whose mem-
bers were public and private - but predominantly public - schools, id. at 928, was
engaged in state action because of "pervasive entwinement [with the state] to the point of
largely overlapping identity." Id. at 934. (Emphasis added.)
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property may also be important, particularly because the physical loca-
tion makes it more likely that other people will view the action in ques-
tion as attributable to the state. 128 Extensive state regulation of the
private actor might also be seen as a form of interweaving, although
current case law insists that such regulation is not dispositive if it does
not actually address and constrain the particular conduct by the actor
that is being challenged. 129 Providing a rationed resource - such as
playing time on publicly maintained sports fields - might also impli-
cate the state in the private conduct, both by assisting that conduct and
by precluding competing uses by other private actors who would not
compromise constitutional values. 13 0 And, finally, joint participation
by private actors and public officials - for example, in a "corrupt con-
spiracy involving bribery of [a] judge,"''1 but also in some much less
egregious contexts - will make the private actors' conduct state ac-
tion, though by no means every coincidence of interests between pri-
vate and public actors amounts to joint conduct. 13 2
128. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. at 723-26; Edmonson v.
Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 500 U.S. at 628 (race-based peremptory challenges to po-
tential civil jurors are made in "the courthouse itself"); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S.
42, 53 (1992) (making the same point with regard to peremptory challenges by crimi-
nal defendants).
129. "[T]he inquiry must be whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the
State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter
may be fairly treated as that of the State itself." Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419
U.S. at 351. See also American Manufacturers Mutual Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 52
(1999) (insurers' decision to "invoke utilization review" and withhold insurance bene-
fits pending that review is not state action, even though the utilization review system is
an adjudicatory system created by the state, because the state "authorizes, but does not
require, insurers to withhold payments for disputed medical treatment" and the state
neither compels nor sets standards for the insurers' decisions).
130. See Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 574 (1974) (rationing of
"otherwise freely accessible recreational facilities" will present a stronger case for find-
ing state action "than if the facilities are simply available to all comers without condition
or reservations"); but cf. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic
Committee, 483 U.S. 522, 544 (1987) (federal statutory grant to USOC of exclusive use
of the word "Olympic" is comparable to, though more extensive than, typical trademark
rights, and does not make USOC's conduct into state action).
131. Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 28 (1980).
132. See Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 486
(1988) ("when private parties make use of state procedures with the overt, significant
assistance of state officials, state action may be found"; here, state action found in pro-
bate court's involvement in application of a statute barring claims against estate that are
not filed within a specified period); Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co. 457 U.S. 922, 942
(1982) (findingjoint participation, and hence state action, "when the State has created
a system whereby state officials will attach property on the ex parte application of one
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E. The relevance of state action considerations
As the preceding discussion suggests, the current state action juris-
prudence of the United States Supreme Court takes a relatively restric-
tive view of the circumstances under which private action should be
viewed as public. It is not my intention to argue that South Africa
should embrace this particular view. I do suggest, however, that South
African decisions under section 8(2) should take into account the vari-
ous factors, many of them identified in American case law, that estab-
lish the extent of the links between a putatively private actor and the
state. These factors can help the courts to identify those cases in which
the Bill of Rights should be applied, and they may well also help the
courts to determine, in these cases, when to render explicit constitu-
tional rulings.' 33
In making this suggestion, I acknowledge that it may ,sometimes
be very difficult to distinguish clearly between those private actors with
close links to the state and those with less significant ties. It is possible
to argue that every legal action is state action, since every such action is
authorized by law and ultimately every actor who abides by the law is
enabled to act by the protection of the legal system. It can also be
argued that every illegal action is state action as well, since it represents
a failure by the state to prevent illegality.1 34
But while state action may well be omnipresent, it does not follow
that all private actors are equally linked to the state. Surely the truth is
quite the opposite. Private individuals who actually conspire with state
officials, for example, have created an interlocking between themselves
and state authority that other people do not share. The citizens of a
modern state, where government regulation is pervasive, are more en-
gaged with the state than their forebears in the less regulated world of
party to a private dispute"). But see id. at 951 n.8 (Powell, J., dissenting) (arguing that
majority mistakenly found state action in this context, and noting that "[i]t is unclear
why a private party engages in state action when filing papers seeking an attachment of
property, but not when seeking other relief (e.g. an injunction), or when summoning
police to investigate a suspected crime").
133. On the different ways the Bill of Rights can be used in South African adjudica-
tion, see page [628] supra.
134. For careful arguments that all action is state action under positivist and natu-
ral law philosophical approaches, see Chemerinsky, supra note 90, at 522-31. Other
scholars have also concluded that state action of some sort is ubiquitous. See, e.g., Larry
Alexander, The Public/Private Distinction and Constitutional Limits on Private Power, 10
CONST. COMM. 361, 362-64 (1993); Kay, supra note 114, at 334-37.
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the nineteenth century. 135 Moreover, the fact that there is some mea-
sure of state action in all conduct does not logically preclude us from
identifying a category of action that we will treat with special constitu-
tional stringency. Whatever the ambiguities at the margins, after all, we
have no difficulty in distinguishing the government itself from the rest
of the individuals and private entities in society - even though govern-
ment officials, like the rest of society, are engaged in state action. If the
factors used in state action inquiries were so formless that actual deci-
sionmaking using them were truly unpredictable, then we would be
well advised not to invoke them, but in practice (even if not in theory)
it seems to me that this body of law is more coherent than that.
It seems particularly appropriate to pay attention to the elements
of state-connectedness, finally, because those elements are today so
much under political control. South Africa - or the United States -
can pursue most governmental objectives by establishing state bureau-
cracies to achieve them; by relying on private actors, but enmeshing
them in elaborate regulations; and by resting much greater discretion
and freedom from oversight in individual people. As long as it is rea-
sonably clear what level of constitutional regulation each of these
choices will trigger, each country can shape its social policies with the
constitutional consequences in mind. A South African private actor's
susceptibility to constitutional duties, therefore, is not an ineffable ab-
straction but rather should be largely a product of conscious political
choice - both by the framers of the constitution and by the legislators
and administrators who establish levels of state-connectedness through
the policies they shape.
That said, the inquiry we should make is not into the sheer nu-
merical total of private-public links in any case, but rather into their
character. Put differently, the "state action" aspect of the section 8(2)
inquiry should be into whether the connections between the private
actor and the state make imposition of constitutional obligations on
that actor more or less appropriate. This reformulation is only helpful,
however, if the "state" or "private" character of an actor really does
have any relevance to determining whether that actor should be
placed under constitutional obligations. I have already argued more
generally that the "status" of the actor is relevant to the nature of the
135. Seidman observes that when, in the New Deal, "government regulation was
the norm rather than the exception, virtually all conduct came to be seen as, in some




rights and duties he or she should shoulder;18 6 here let us look more
precisely at the significance of the actor's state-connectedness. In un-
dertaking this examination, I do not mean to argue that state-connect-
edness is ordinarily dispositive by itself, or to suggest that South
African courts should disregard the more direct inquiries into the na-
ture of the right and of the duty associated with it that our discussion
of the pharmaceutical companies began with. I argue only that the fac-
tors of state-connectedness suggested by American state action are rele-
vant too. As we will see, they are relevant in four respects.
First, extending the constitution's reach to the relations of private
actors expands the responsibilities of the courts beyond the protection
of individuals against the state, the rights protection function that
seems most firmly rooted in South African legal tradition and most
central to the constitutional law of Western countries. 13 7 Even the task
of revising the common law in light of constitutional values, in cases
where the Bill of Rights is not considered applicable as such, is a formi-
dable one. South Africa's Constitutional Court has already addressed a
very wide range of more traditional questions of individual rights and
government power in its effort to create ajurisprudence for a new na-
tion. That court, and those below it, have reason not to travel too
swiftly, or too far, in even more innovative directions, because it is at
least possible, as we saw earlier, that these new directions will entail
substantial risks to majoritarian decisionmaking and to the protection
of rights. Using the links private actors have with the state as a guide-
post in choosing which private actors to bring under constitutional du-
ties will tend to keep the courts on relatively better mapped terrain.
138
Second, cases in which the private actor wields power closely
linked to the state may feature more risk of oppression than those in
which the private actor's conduct is more independent of state aid. I
136. See pages [643-44] supra.
137. The application of socioeconomic rights to private actors will surely involve
particularly novel jurisprudential issues.
138. In addition, it seems fair to say that when the state itself is the constitutional
wrongdoer, the blow to separation of powers entailed in judicial intervention is less
acute than where the state is without fault. After all, the purpose of establishing a sepa-
ration of powers is not to insulate any branch's wrongdoing from effective control. As
Sprigman and Osborne observe, "the Constitution must of necessity be enforced in
such instance by the judiciary, the only body with the independence and authority re-
quired to bring the legislature to heel." Sprigman & Osborne, supra note 43, at 48. To
the extent that private actors with state connections are, indeed, linked to the state
itself, again the blow to political branch prerogative entailed in judicial intervention
seems less acute.
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do not mean that the relation of citizen to state is always more threat-
ening than the relation, say, of citizen to corporation. On the contrary,
section 8(2) reflects the framers' belief that sometimes these two rela-
tionships pose very similar dangers of harm to constitutional values.
But section 8(1) reflects a clear judgment that state power is always
potentially worrisome. If we learn that a private entity is highly regu-
lated by the state, or funded by the state, or working closely with the
state, or performing a task usually performed by the state, we may have
reason to conclude that the power wielded by that entity is like state
power.
Third, even where actors linked to the state do not exercise spe-
cially oppressive power, their links to the state may give us particular
moral reason to regulate their conduct. When a private actor is closely
regulated by the state, but permitted to discriminate, we may well ask
why the state did not extend its regulatory reach just a little further, to
bar this conduct. The same may be said when the state chooses to fund
a private actor, or to work closely with one, or to entrust a public func-
tion to one. In all these cases, we may be concerned partly with the
simple extent of power, but we may also be concerned with our own
complicity, through the state that we help govern, in whatever power,
large or small, is being exercised. 13 9
Fourth, the presence or absence of connections with the state is
likely to be very relevant to determining which private actors have the
strongest moral claims to exemption from constitutional duties. Even if
South African law ultimately concludes that the state in some circum-
stances can possess constitutional rights, it is hard to conceive of the
state as having the same claims to liberty as a private individual does.
The state cannot exclude or disregard any of its citizens. An entity like
the state - a large, highly regulated utility, for example - might be
similarly obliged to serve all potential customers, or at least not to deny
any of them access to its services. But a private individual needs a range
of liberties in such aspects of life as marriage, cultural affiliation, and
personal friendships.140 Where these liberties are potentially invaded,
139. Barbara Rook Snyder has defended the state action doctorine on the ground
that "[t]he representative nature of [state actors'] roles is more than symbolic; it is
real." Snyder, supra note 114, at 1061.
140. Cockrell observes that "relationships between private individuals are far more
complex than relations between the state and citizen, for they involve not only the
exercise of power but also other subtly nuanced constituents such as love, hatred, kin-
ship, sexuality, intimacy etcetera." Cockrell, supra note 48, at 3A-12.
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there may be most reason for courts not to impose constitutional
duties.
If South African courts use the state action inquiries to respond to
these four considerations - rather than to attempt a numerical count
of levels of state connection - then I suggest they will be able to make
better choices about whether to apply the Bill of Rights to private ac-
tors than they otherwise would. Certainly there may be other actors,
with little special connection to the state, who also should be regulated
under the constitution. A husband violently abusing his wife might be
such a person. 141 So might a householder dominating the life of a ser-
vant, or a parent sexually molesting his child. I am uneasy about ex-
tending the constitution's reach to the conduct of so many individuals
in so many contexts, but reading section 8(2) to encompass a "state
action" inquiry by no means rules out such choices. The state action
issues are part of the inquiry into the nature of the right and the na-
ture of the duty associated with the right that section 8(2) mandates;
they are also, in particular, part of the inquiry into the extent and the
justification of the power one actor wields over another. But they are
not the whole of these inquiries, and South African courts will certainly
be able to decide that a private actor with no specially significant links
to the state is still, for other reasons, someone whom the constitution
should regulate.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the questions that American state action juris-
prudence raises remain pertinent, even in the context of the South
African constitution's much greater receptiveness to the idea of hori-
zontal application of rights. I have argued here that in undertaking
this expansion of the constitution's reach, the courts will have reason
to proceed with some caution - to "make haste slowly." One of the
great virtues of section 8 (3)'s emphasis on constitutional common law
or indirect application is that courts can proceed this way. Indeed, they
can choose today to treat a matter as not calling for the "application"
of the constitution at all, and conclude after some years' experience, as
a common law court would, that accumulated wisdom calls for a
change of approach. Even if the courts decide never to "apply" the Bill
of Rights in a particular area, moreover, they will still be able, and
141. See generally Frances Olsen, Constitutional Law: Feminist Critiques of the Public!
Private Distinction, 10 CONSr. COMM. 319 (1993).
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obliged, to promote Bill of Rights values as they work with the com-
mon law and legislation that do apply.
But a measure of caution by no means precludes the "application"
of the Bill of Rights to some private actors today, even if they are not
"organs of state" under section 239. While the question is a complex
one, the terrible force of the patients' rights at stake in the context of
AIDS drug prices, and the links pharmaceutical companies' power has
to the state, suggest that these companies might rightly be found to
have a constitutional duty to provide access to their drugs. On the
other hand, the individual parent who lacks the money to give her
child even basic nutrition no doubt should be subject to the law's
power (and hopefully the law's aid), but it hardly seems appropriate to
transform such issues of individual difficulty into constitutional cases.
In between are cases like the builder of low-income housing,
neither so powerful as the pharmaceutical company nor engaged in
conduct so personal and individual as that of the parent. Here, the
various factors suggested by American state action jurisprudence may
be very helpful in distinguishing those private actors who should be
subject to the constitution's claims from those who should not. A
builder who enters into a private contract with a particular buyer for a
dwelling, even a substandard one, does not seem to have any connec-
tion with the state that would call for constitutionalizing the regulation
of his or her actions. In contrast, a builder who obtains subsidized fi-
nancing pursuant to a government housing program, or who contracts
with the government to build particular houses for the government to
make available to would-be buyers, or who takes advantage of special
housing code provisions passed in an effort to facilitate housing con-
struction for poor people - and especially a builder with multiple
links of this kind - might well be seen as the equivalent of a state
actor with respect to the claims of those seeking housing.142
Any recognition of constitutional duties incumbent on private ac-
tors would amount to a significant departure from the general position
142. The same would not be true with respect, for example, to the free speech
claims of the builder's employees. A builder who receives subsidized financing has a
link to the government with respect to the houses he or she builds, but the government
has no evident involvement with the same builder's decision to bar political speech on
the construction site. Unless the government somehow involved itself with the suppres-
sion of speech - for example, by informally telling the builder that no loans would be
forthcoming unless dissident speech was suppressed - the builder's actions in this re-
gard should be treated, at least so far as state-connectedness is concerned, as outside
the constitution's purview.
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adopted by the Constitutional Court in its first encounter with the
horizontality problem. The 1996 constitution appears to reject the Du
Plessis v. De Klerk approach at least in part, however, in favor of far-
reaching - but ambiguous - authorizations of the application of con-
stitutional rights to private actors. Taking up the invitation of the new
constitution is a challenging and potentially somewhat risky enterprise,
but I do not in the least mean to urge South Africa's courts to resist
this invitation. Rather, I have sought to demonstrate that American
state action doctrine can provide South Africa with one set of factors to
use in deciding when to apply the constitution in this way. These fac-
tors are by no means the whole of what South African courts will need
to consider, and they do not turn challenging issues into easy ones, but
I hope they will assist the South African courts as they chart this new
ground.

